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I. Introduction
Not too long ago, economically minded antitrust scholars were a
gloomy bunch. In his famous 1978 antitrust critique, whose very title
mocked antitrust's incoherence, Robert Bork remarked that "modern antitrust
ha[d] so decayed that the policy [was] no longer intellectually respectable,",
and he cynically referred to then-prevailing antitrust rules as "an internal
tariff against domestic competition and free trade."' About the time Bork's
book was published, Richard Posner published Antitrust Law: An Economic
Perspective. Posner's book, whose title indicated the prevalence of
noneconomic perspectives on antitrust, similarly complained (albeit less
polemically) that "[t]he conventional tools of antitrust analysis ha[d] not
stood up well under the pressures of rapid expansion of the role and impor-
tance of antitrust enforcement."
4
My, how times have changed. The years since Bork and Posner
published their first editions have witnessed several developments that, from
the perspective of economically minded antitrust scholars, have been quite
salutary: the composition of the Supreme Court has changed to include more
Justices possessing a "sympathetic understanding of the business world";5 a
robust body of scholarship, produced largely by members of the Chicago
School, has persuasively called for antitrust to be both more consumer
t Ben V. and Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa College of
Law.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; Senior Fellow, Contracting
and Organizations Research Institute. Paul Stancil and Joshua Wright provided helpful comments
on a draft of this review.
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 418 (1st ed.
1978).
2. Id. at 7.
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1st ed. 1976).
4. Id. at vii.
5. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, at x-xi (Free
Press ed. 1993) (1978).
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focused and more economically rigorous;6 the antitrust enforcement agencies
have altered their views in accord with this scholarship; 7 and members of the
federal judiciary-including lower court judges-have become more eco-
nomically sophisticated. In subsequent editions of their classic antitrust
works, both Bork and Posner have lauded these developments. Bork entitled
the introduction to his 1993 second edition "The Passing of the Crisis,"9 and
Posner went so far as to drop his first edition's subtitle (An Economic
Perspective) in recognition of the fact that "the other perspectives ha[d]
largely fallen away."'
But the work is not done. Despite the "passing of the crisis," Bork ac-
knowledges that "areas for improvement remain,"1 and Posner remarks that
the antitrust enterprise, though now based on "economically rational
principles," could still use some tweaking. 12 He observes that "[t]he chief
worry at present is not doctrine or direction, but implementation.,'
13
Into this discussion enters renowned antitrust scholar Herbert
Hovenkamp, with his wonderful new book, The Antitrust Enterprise:
Principle and Execution (The Antitrust Enterprise). Like Bork and Posner,
Hovenkamp rejoices that antitrust law has (generally) shed its Warren Court
era focus on protecting competitors rather than competition and has properly
defined competition in a manner that focuses not on the number of firms in a
market but on the degree to which the market generates low prices, high
output, and innovation. 14  Rather than criticizing contemporary antitrust's
fundamental objectives, Hovenkamp sets out to tackle Posner's "chief
worry" about antitrust implementation, proposing a number of substantive
and procedural reforms that would make the antitrust enterprise work better.
6. See id. at xi-xiii (discussing the Chicago School's influence).
7. See id. at 438-39 ("Much of the improvement in antitrust policy over the past decade and a
half has come not from the courts but from the enforcement agencies."); Richard A. Posner,
Introduction to Baxter Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1007, 1007-09 (1999) (explaining how the
Department of Justice's enforcement philosophy changed in the 1980s under the leadership of
William Baxter, who embraced Chicago School theories and endorsed an economic analysis of
antitrust law); Richard Schmalensee, Bill Baxter in the Antitrust Arena: An Economist's
Appreciation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1317, 1323-30 (1999) (lauding William Baxter's focus on
economics while he ran the Department of Justice Antitrust Division).
8. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 7
(2005) (discussing the increased economic sophistication of the federal judiciary).
9. BORK, supra note 5, at ix.
10. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at vii (2d ed. 2001).
11. BORK, supra note 5, at xiv.
12. POSNER, supra note 10, at viii.
13. Id.
14. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 2. Hovenkamp contends that:
Antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if intervention into the market is economically
justified. That entails that the market be "bigger" in some sense as a result of
intervention-whether "bigger" is measured by higher output, improved quality, lower
prices, or more innovation. Furthermore, the increase must be enough to justify the
high cost of operating the antitrust machinery.
Id. at 10.
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This Review evaluates Hovenkamp's ideas for tweaking antitrust's
business model, concluding that most of his proposed changes are sound, that
a few might be slightly revised to enhance their effectiveness or
administrability, and that a couple are downright unwise. Because
Hovenkamp's implementation-focused discussion necessarily covers a num-
ber of specific antitrust topics rather than hammering a single general theme,
this Review addresses his prescriptions for numerous antitrust doctrines. Part
II summarizes The Antitrust Enterprise, offering a number of "shorter" criti-
cisms of Hovenkamp's arguments and proposals. Part III then provides
longer, more detailed critiques of two of Hovenkamp's suggestions: his pro-
posal that the Supreme Court abandon the indirect purchaser rule and his
proposed test for identifying exclusionary conduct. Part IV concludes the
Review.
II. Summary and Analysis
Hovenkamp's book is divided into three parts: Part I examines "the
institutional enterprise of antitrust" at a relatively high level, considering
what the body of law is trying to accomplish and how its procedures should
be tailored to achieve that end. Part II examines the primary substantive an-
titrust doctrines as they have been developed in "traditional" markets. Part
III then turns to the role of antitrust in markets involving regulated industries,
heavy intellectual property components, and network effects.
A. Part I: Possibilities and Limits
In examining the institutional enterprise of antitrust, Hovenkamp
considers antitrust's "core economics, its disconcerting special interest
origins and divergent schools, and the institutional scheme we have created
for enforcing the antitrust laws."
' 15
1. Antitrust's Core Economics, Origins, and Divergent Schools.-
While the primary focus of Hovenkamp's book is antitrust implementation,
he does, as the book's subtitle suggests, devote some attention to underlying
principles. His consideration of antitrust's core economics, origins, and di-
vergent schools constitutes most of the "principle" part of the book. Because
antitrust's ultimate target is the negative economic effects stemming from
market power, Hovenkamp begins by considering exactly what those effects
are.'6  He thus explains the familiar monopoly pricing model,' 7 which
15. Id. at 11.
16. For the uninitiated, Hovenkamp's lucid discussion of basic antitrust economics will prove
quite useful. While Hovenkamp's explanations will be familiar to readers versed in antitrust
economics, even seasoned antitrust scholars may be enlightened by his account of the monopoly
pricing model's historical origins, id. at 15-16, and his discussion of the limits of Oliver
Williamson's welfare trade-off model, id. at 28-29.
17. The monopoly pricing model is reproduced as Figure 1 in Part III, infra p. 189.
2006]
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demonstrates how market power can generate both a transfer of surplus from
consumers to producers and a deadweight social loss,1 8 and the welfare trade-
off model,19 which demonstrates the effects of practices that simultaneously
increase market power and create productive efficiencies.20  Antitrust,
however, is ultimately law, and Hovenkamp therefore shifts quickly to
questions of legal interpretation. In particular, he considers (1) the extent to
which courts should rely on legislative history in interpreting the remarkably
sparse and vague antitrust statutes; (2) the ultimate criterion by which chal-
lenged practices should be evaluated; and (3) the degree to which courts
should intervene in private markets in order to protect competition.
The legislative history of the antitrust laws is voluminous, and one
could likely find some support for just about any purported "congressional
intent.' ,21 Bork, for example, once attempted to cobble together snippets of
legislative history to support his view that the antitrust laws are ultimately
concerned with ensuring high output, low prices, and maximum innovation
for consumers.22 Robert Lande has argued that legislative history shows that
the antitrust laws were principally aimed at preventing transfers of surplus
from consumers to business firms. 23 Hovenkamp rejects both of these read-
ings of the legislative history.24 The better view, he contends, is that
Congress was seeking to protect small businesses from larger, more efficient
25
competitors.
But this does not mean, Hovenkamp says, that courts should interpret
the antitrust laws to protect small businesses from larger, more efficient
firms. He offers three reasons for adhering to the consumer welfare principle
in interpreting the antitrust laws, despite their "discomfiting legislative
history." First is the language of the statutes themselves. Hovenkamp
18. In the monopoly pricing model, wealth is transferred from consumers to producers as
consumers pay higher prices for the goods or services at issue, and social utility is reduced (i.e.,
there is a "deadweight loss") as price-sensitive consumers switch from the monopolized product to
less desirable substitutes. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 18-20.
19. The welfare trade-off model is reproduced as Figure 2 in Part III, infra p. 190.
20. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 15-30. In the welfare trade-off model, a business practice
(usually a collaboration or unilateral exclusionary practice) transforms a competitive market to
monopoly but simultaneously produces cost savings for the producer. Generally speaking, the
collaboration will be economically efficient if the productive/distributional efficiencies outweigh
the allocative inefficiencies resulting from the participants' enhanced market power. Unfortunately,
Hovenkamp notes, courts are ill-equipped to balance these various effects. Id. at 30.
21. Cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disparaging the
indeterminacy of legislative history and noting Judge Leventhal's famous description of the use of
legislative history "as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the
heads of the guests for one's friends").
22. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 11-
30 (1966).
23. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68 (1982).
24. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 40-42.
25. Id. at 42.
[Vol. 85:153
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observes that "Congress picked economic words [e.g., 'competition' and
'monopoly'] and chose not to tie its own idiosyncratic meanings to them,"
thereby indicating that the law should evolve along with prevailing economic
theory.26 Second, "the very spareness of the statutes" suggests that Congress
intended the courts to create a "common law" of antitrust, and just as eco-
nomics has dictated the formulation of tort and contract doctrines, it should
similarly do so with antitrust.27 Finally, Hovenkamp argues, administrability
concerns call for jettisoning the protectionist legislative history in favor of an
interpretive approach focused on consumer welfare. If the antitrust laws are
a "small business welfare prescription," courts are "completely out to sea.,
28
By contrast, a consumer welfare criterion provides antitrust courts with rela-
tively definite guidance.
Once courts have freed antitrust from its troubling legislative history
and settled on an ultimate criterion for evaluating practices challenged as
anticompetitive, they must determine the extent to which they should
intervene in markets in an attempt to control antitrust violations. On this
point, scholars have diverged. Those identified with the Chicago School,
dedicated to the twin propositions that markets are relatively simple and ro-
bust and that government is not very good at improving on market outcomes,
have been relatively noninterventionist-generally advocating that govern-
ment stay its hand except in cases of blatantly anticompetitive practices like
price-fixing, market division, or mergers to monopoly.29 While Hovenkamp
has some kind words for the Chicago School-for example, he agrees that it
demolished the leverage theory of tying 3° and helpfully drew attention to the
degree to which new entry would undermine many attempts at
monopolization 3 1-he ultimately aligns himself with the competing Harvard
School, which he says is "modestly more interventionist" than the Chicago
School.32 As Hovenkamp describes it, the Harvard School developed out of
Cournot oligopoly theory, 33 evolved substantially in the late 1970s, 34 and
became "the position most followed by the federal courts today.,
35
Hovenkamp distances himself from "post-Chicago" antitrust, which starts
with the assumption that markets are messier and more complex than the
Chicago School imagined and attempts to model strategic, anticompetitive
26. Id. at 43.
27. Id. at 44.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 32-35.
30. Id. at 34; see infra note 171 (discussing Hovenkamp's treatment of tying).
31. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 32.
32. Id. at 38.
33. Id. at 35.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id.
2006]
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behavior using game theory.36 While Hovenkamp credits post-Chicago anti-
trust for recognizing "that markets are more varied and complex than the
orthodox Chicago School was willing to admit," he ultimately concludes that
"the complexity of post-Chicago theories would force the federal courts to
confront problems that they are not capable of solving."
37
One might quibble here with Hovenkamp's treatment of the Chicago
School. He confines the Chicago School to the early "polemical works" of
its adherents, 38 even though a prominent adherent, Judge Posner, has explic-
itly distanced himself from some of those polemical works. 39 By contrast, he
affords the Harvard School great freedom to evolve. Indeed, he acknowl-
edges that the Harvard School all but abandoned its structuralist roots and
"underwent a significant transformation in the late 1970s" into something
that looks much more, well, Chicagoan. n° It is not entirely clear why the
Harvard School is permitted to evolve while the Chicago School is not, but
there is little point in arguing over bragging rights. The two originally dis-
tinct schools have converged significantly, 4' and, as Hovenkamp repeatedly
acknowledges, prevailing antitrust doctrine is coated with Chicago's
fingerprints. Moreover, the noninterventionist "[p]rinciples of [a]ntitrust
[a]dministration" Hovenkamp advocates in his discussion of the design of
antitrust rules suggest that Hovenkamp is more of a Chicagoan than he might
care to admit.42
2. Antitrust's Enforcement Scheme.-Having briefly outlined his views
on antitrust's underlying principles, Hovenkamp quickly shifts his focus to
36. Id. at 38-39 (describing post-Chicago antitrust); e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID
KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 5 (1983); Michael
Katz, Vertical Contractual Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 655
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration:
Determinants and Effects, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra, at 183; Michael
A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988); Michael
Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982).
37. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 39.
38. Id. at 37.
39. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 10, at 194 ("Some economists believe that it is virtually
impossible for a firm or group of firms ever to exclude competitors or potential competitors from
the market, other than by buying them out or paying them off in some other fashion, unless they
have lower costs or obtain the aid of the government in the form of a grant of a patent or other
exclusive right. I do not agree.").
40. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 37.
41. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
933-44 (1979) (describing "the growing convergence of the two schools" (typeface altered)).
42. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 50-56. The principles are: "not every anticompetitive
practice can be condemned"; "intent evidence should be used sparingly"; "whether intervention is
justified may depend on the remedy"; "an antitrust rule that cannot be administered effectively is
worse than no rule at all"; and "administrative and compliance costs count." Id. at 50-54 (typeface
altered). As Hovenkamp admits, "[Tihe rather tolerant Chicago School rule may be the best one for
policy purposes even though substantial anticompetitive behavior goes undisciplined, simply
because we cannot recognize and remedy it with sufficient confidence." Id. at 48.
[Vol. 85:153
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execution by considering antitrust's enforcement scheme. He focuses pri-
marily on private enforcement, defending private enforcement actions and
advancing some proposals for enhancing their effectiveness.
a. Defending Private Enforcement Actions.-Private enforcement
actions, particularly those initiated by competitors of the defendant, can be
troubling. Automatic trebling of damages invites marginal, frivolous
lawsuits,43 and the prospect of treble damages actions can lead firms to
forego practices that are efficient on the whole but might be mischaracterized
in litigation as anticompetitive. 4 Competitor lawsuits are especially prone to
abuse because competitors are injured both by a defendant's anticompetitive
conduct and by its business practices that reduce its costs, improve the qual-
ity of its products and services, or both.45 For these reasons, some have
argued for the curtailment of private enforcement actions, especially those
initiated by a defendant's competitors.46
Hovenkamp, however, defends both private enforcement in general and
competitor actions in particular. In what he labels "the delicate case for pri-
vate enforcement,, 47 he asserts two arguments against a system of purely
public antitrust enforcement. First, such a system would require "much
larger enforcement agencies than we currently have. 48  Second, purely
public enforcement is undesirable because "government enforcement
agencies... tend to place most of their enforcement resources into
prosecuting a relatively small range of violations. 4 9 Hovenkamp observes
that the enforcement agencies, which expend most of their efforts on
evaluating and prosecuting horizontal mergers and various forms of
horizontal collusion, virtually ignore the price discrimination provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act and rarely challenge vertical practices or,
43. Id. at 57.
44. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 266-
67 (2003) (observing that vague standards for legality and the possibility of massive treble damages
awards "cannot help but chill investments to create product offerings with a sufficient quality or
cost advantage over preexisting market options").
45. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 57, 70.
46. See, e.g., Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 563-67 (1991) (identifying the core conditions
necessary for anticompetitive exclusion and recommending that courts use these conditions to
exclude frivolous suits filed by competitor-plaintiffs); cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 331-33 (1981) (contending that only
consumers-not competitors-should have the right to challenge predatory business practices);
William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2151,
2162-65 (1990) (suggesting that businesses should have only a limited right to sue competitors for
exclusionary practices).
47. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 58 (typeface altered).
48. Id. at 59-60.
49. Id. at 60.
2006]
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Microsoft5° notwithstanding, unilateral practices by dominant firms. 5 1 With
respect to competitor actions in particular, Hovenkamp maintains that such
actions should be retained because competitors, generally the immediate
victims of anticompetitive conduct, are "early detectors" of exclusionary
conduct 52 and are thus well-positioned to prosecute antitrust violations
"before they cause significant consumer harm.,
53
Hovenkamp's defense of private enforcement in general, and competitor
lawsuits in particular, is one of the weakest parts of the book. Neither of his
arguments in favor of retaining private enforcement actions is convincing.
As Hovenkamp concedes, the bigger budgets required for a purely public
enforcement system could be attained by allowing the enforcement agencies
to finance their operations via fines or surrogate damage recoveries from
defendants.54  And the fact that enforcement agencies focus
disproportionately on horizontal mergers and collusion is entirely proper:
competition-threatening mergers and horizontal collusion are precisely the
practices that are most likely to damage competition and injure consumers,
"where there is a strong consensus finding competitive danger., 55 Indeed,
Hovenkamp's concern that the enforcement agencies do not vigorously
enforce the Robinson-Patman Act or pursue vertical practices is ironic given
that he later argues for Robinson-Patman's repeal5 6 and insists that the vast
majority of vertical practices are efficient.57 Perhaps a purely public
enforcement system would generate fewer monopolization actions, but, as
Hovenkamp repeatedly acknowledges, the law generally should be more
tolerant of unilateral practices than concerted behavior,58  and the
enforcement agencies have certainly indicated a willingness to pursue what
they perceive to be monopolization. 59 Finally, Hovenkamp himself notes a
key reason for limiting private enforcement actions: the prevalence of jury
trials in such lawsuits. 60 Hovenkamp is rightfully adamant that juries are ill-
equipped to make the fact determinations required to decide complex
50. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd in part, 253 F.3d
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
51. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 60. The government's monopolization action against
Microsoft demonstrates that the enforcement agencies do sometimes challenge unilateral practices
by dominant firms. See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30.
52. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 68.
53. Id. at 70.
54. Id. at 60.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 191-98.
57. Id. at 181-90, 198-206.
58. Id. at 108-11.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing
government action alleging monopolization based on exclusive dealing arrangements by artificial
teeth manufacturer with 75%-80% market share on a revenue basis); United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing government action challenging allegedly
exclusionary practices of a computer operating system manufacturer with 800/o-95% market share).
60. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 61.
[Vol. 85:153
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antitrust cases.61 While most public antitrust actions (except for criminal
actions) do not involve juries, the vast majority of private actions do. Hence,
Hovenkamp's "delicate case for private enforcement" is delicate indeed.
Hovenkamp's "early warning" argument for retaining private
competitor lawsuits is similarly unconvincing. There is no reason that the
comparative advantages of competitors-the speed with which they perceive
anticompetitive conduct and their knowledge of the market at issue62 -
cannot be harnessed in a purely public enforcement scheme. Even if treble
damages were unavailable, competitors have incentives to ensure that their
rivals are punished for anticompetitive practices, making it likely that they
would report misbehaving rivals to the public enforcement agencies and
cooperate in prosecuting the violators. 63 To the extent competitors were not
adequately motivated to report violations and provide the information
necessary for successful prosecution, they could be so motivated if the
enforcement scheme were modified to reward reporters or cooperators with a
bounty, much the way the False Claims Act rewards qui tam relators for
reporting fraud against the government.64 In short, it is entirely possible to
structure a purely public enforcement scheme that would encourage reporting
and cooperation by "early detector" competitors, while giving the
enforcement agencies the power to stop lawsuits that are frivolous, likely to
deter procompetitive practices, or both. Recent successful competitor
lawsuits that have resulted in consumer-unfriendly precedents suggest that
such an enforcement scheme would represent a substantial improvement on
the status quo.65
Finally, Hovenkamp's position on private enforcement fails to
acknowledge a possible "middle ground" position in which private actions
pursuing horizontal collusion are permitted, but actions challenging vertical
61. See, e.g., id. at 80 ("Not only will the jury be less technically competent [than the judge]; it
will also be less skilled in listening to experts, and more likely to be persuaded by things that are
irrelevant to the issue.").
62. See id. at 69 (noting that "[competitors'] losses occur as soon as the predator cuts its price"
and "[c]ompetitors are likely to be familiar with the dominant firm's technology and costs, perhaps
because their own technology and costs are similar").
63. Since competitors generally do not stand in a vertical relationship to their rivals (i.e., do not
purchase from or sell to their rivals), they have no incentive to hold their punches in order to protect
the business relationship. Assuming that their expected costs of reporting and cooperation are less
than the expected benefits of seeing their rivals punished, competitors should provide enforcement
authorities with the "early warning" benefits they would provide in a private lawsuit.
64. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000) (providing for an award to a qui tam relator pursuing an
action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2000)).
65. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (affirming that
3M's strategies that benefited consumers but disadvantaged LePage's, an admittedly less efficient
competitor, were in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)); Conwood Co. v.
U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 795 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the defendant's business tactics
"rose above isolated tortious activity and [were] exclusionary without a legitimate business
justification"). For criticisms of these cases, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 81-82, 89-91
(criticizing Conwood), and Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1688, 1718-26 (2005) (criticizing LePage's).
2006]
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and exclusionary practices are relegated to public enforcement. Courts have
developed fairly sophisticated tools for identifying anticompetitive horizontal
restraints of trade,66 and they have formulated procedural devices (such as the
Matsushita67 summary judgment standard) that facilitate quick disposal of
meritless lawsuits.68 In addition, the parties most likely to challenge
horizontal restraints-purchasers who pay a higher price or suffer from
reduced innovation because of the restraint-are likely to face the "right" set
of incentives: challenge the practice if it is output-reducing but not if it
enhances efficiency. By contrast, courts are not very adept at recognizing
when vertical and exclusionary practices are procompetitive, 69 and those
practices are much more likely to be challenged by plaintiffs with a perverse
incentive to challenge a competitor's practice if it affords the competitor a
cost advantage. In short, the antitrust challenges in which courts are most
likely to make "bad" decisions that chill procompetitive conduct are those
involving vertical and exclusionary practices. Accordingly, an optimal
private enforcement policy might seek to posit two screening devices for
such challenges: one at the enforcement agency level (prosecutorial
discretion) and another at the adjudication level. Hovenkamp's all-or-
nothing discussion of private enforcement fails to acknowledge this middle
ground possibility. 70
b. Improving Private Enforcement Actions.-While he is vigorous
in his defense of private enforcement actions, Hovenkamp is not satisfied
with the status quo. He proposes several adjustments to the scheme of
private remedies-most notably, that treble damages be reserved for
clandestine offenses that are clearly anticompetitive and that the indirect
66. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.6, at 253-68 (3d ed. 2005) (describing the analytical tools
courts employ to identify when horizontal restraints are anticompetitive).
67. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
68. See, e.g., id. at 588 ("To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a
plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence 'that tends to exclude the
possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently." (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984))).
69. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 181-206 (describing courts' failure to identify
procompetitive vertical practices); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for
Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73 (2005)
(observing that while "[elconomics and experience provide a strong presumption that certain
coordinated practices are harmful," leading to relatively standard evaluative approaches, "the
welfare effects of unilateral practices are inherently difficult to assess," resulting in significant
variation in courts' analytical approaches); William J. Michael, Holmes and the Bald Man: Why
Rule of Reason Should Be the Standard in Sherman Act Section 2 Cases, 4 PIERCE L. REv. 359,
359-62 (2006) (describing courts' inability to develop workable tools for evaluating unilateral
exclusionary practices).
70. Of course, this could be due to the fact that the middle ground position would require
amending the antitrust statutes, but several of Hovenkamp's other proposals would similarly require
legislative intervention.
(Vol. 85:153
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purchaser rule be abolished.] I defer analysis of the latter suggestion to
subpart III(A) of this Review.72
The trebling of antitrust damages is designed to account for the fact that
many violations (in theory, one-third) are not successfully prosecuted and
punished.73  Trebling thus makes sense, Hovenkamp concedes, for
challenged practices that are likely to be concealed and are unquestionably
worthy of punishment.74 By contrast, "Treble damages make no sense at all
when they are assessed for public acts and reasonable minds can differ about
substantive illegality"; 75 in such cases, damage-trebling likely deters
practices that are procompetitive on the whole but difficult to characterize
and might, if challenged, be deemed to violate some provision of the antitrust
laws.7 6 Hovenkamp therefore suggests that trebling be limited to actions
involving practices, such as naked price-fixing, that are generally concealed
and are unquestionably output reducing.77 For public, potentially efficiency-
enhancing practices like "mergers, most joint ventures, many exclusionary
practices, and nearly all vertical contract practices," the remedy should be
single damages.78
Hovenkamp's proposal resembles, but is probably superior to, Judge
Posner's proposal that damages multipliers be assessed on a case-by-case
basis according to the difficulty of detecting the offense at issue.79 While
Posner's approach would provide more precision and could correct the
underdeterrence resulting from the fact that many concealed violations have
less than a one-in-three chance of successful detection and prosecution, it
would be more difficult to administer and would inevitably spark drawn out,
wasteful disputes over the probability of concealment. Hovenkamp's
approach would be much cleaner: practices could fall only into the single-
71. In addition, Hovenkamp proposes (quite sensibly) that the burden of proving an offense be
tailored to the severity of the remedy (i.e., the more severe the remedy, the greater the proof burden
for the plaintiff), HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 65-66, and that private plaintiffs be denied
structural remedies (e.g., divestiture, break-up, etc.), id. at 63. He also offers a number of sensible
recommendations for improving fact-finding in cases involving expert testimony, which would
include most private antitrust suits. In particular, he recommends (1) that judges scrupulously apply
the admissibility standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 80-81; (2) that courts treat factual disputes over technical
expert theories as though they were questions of law, id. at 84-85; and (3) that judges make more
liberal use of neutral experts, id. at 89-90.
72. See infra notes 229-58 and accompanying text.
73. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 66.
74. Id.




79. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 272. Posner proposed that the jury "be asked to assess (1)
compensatory damages and (2) the probability of concealment separately, with the judge assigned to
make the ultimate damages calculation by dividing (1) by (2)." Id.
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damages bin or the treble-damages bin.80  Thus, Hovenkamp's proposal
offers much of the benefit of Posner's suggested approach but at a
substantially lower administrative cost.
B. Part . Traditional Antitrust Rules
The second part of The Antitrust Enterprise analyzes the substantive
rules of antitrust dealing with restraints of trade, exclusionary practices,
vertical practices, and business mergers. While much of the ground
Hovenkamp covers is fairly well trodden, a number of his reform suggestions
are novel and would substantially improve antitrust's substance. One of the
suggestions-his proposed test for exclusionary conduct-is the subject of an
extended criticism in subpart III(B). 1
1. Restraints of Trade.-Hovenkamp's discussion of restraints of
trade82 proposes helpful reforms for both the per se rule and the rule of
reason. In addition, Hovenkamp suggests that courts alter the way they
determine whether there has been the sort of "agreement" necessary to make
out an illegal restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
a. Improving the Per Se Rule.-Hovenkamp offers two helpful
suggestions for improving the application of the per se rule:83 first, he
proposes that the rule be restricted to "naked" restraints and provides a
workable test for identifying such restraints; second, he suggests that courts
alter the stare decisis effect they afford per se rules.84
80. Of course, policymakers would have to determine the boundaries of the two bins, but that
administrative difficulty does not seem too burdensome.
81. See infra notes 259-93 and accompanying text.
82. One way firms create market power is by agreeing to "restrain trade"-that is, to refrain
from engaging in certain transactions on particular terms, say, at a price below some fixed level
(price-fixing) or within some geographic region (market division). To combat market power
created by agreement, § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 15 US.C. § 1 (2000).
83. The "per se rule" condemns automatically those restraints of trade that are virtually always
unreasonable (i.e., output-reducing). While the language of § 1 condemns "every" concerted
restraint of trade, see id., the Supreme Court realized early on that § 1 cannot mean what it literally
says because all commercial contracts restrain trade. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence."). Accordingly, the Court long ago adopted the rule that
only "unreasonable" restraints of trade are prohibited. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 59-62 (1911).
84. In addition to these two reforms, Hovenkamp calls on courts to characterize per se conduct
early in litigation. Because the entire point of the per se rule is to minimize administrative costs, it
is important that the process of characterizing a restraint be less costly than a full rule of reason
analysis. To ensure that plaintiffs do not unnecessarily prepare costly rule of reason cases "just to
be safe," Hovenkamp sensibly proposes the following:
A plaintiff who believes that it has a good per se case should be able to identify the
facts it needs for per se condemnation and obtain judicial approval to proceed to
discovery of those facts .... [I]f the per se record is inconclusive, then further
discovery under the rule of reason will be necessary.
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i. Identifying "Naked" Restraints.-Courts and commentators
often remark that the per se rule applies to particular behaviors (e.g., price-
fixing, market division, or bid-rigging) 85 and that it is not properly applied to
competition-limiting agreements that are included in otherwise efficient joint
ventures.86 Both remarks, Hovenkamp says, are troubling. Automatically
applying the per se rule to particular behaviors like price-fixing is improper
because it is easy to conceive of instances of the suspect behavior that should
not be per se illegal.87 Many joint ventures, for example, include literal
agreements to fix prices or divide markets, yet they are not the type of
agreements for which per se treatment is appropriate. 88 Automatically
withholding per se treatment from competition-limiting agreements that are
included in otherwise efficient joint ventures is inappropriate because many
such restraints are not essential to the joint venture's effectiveness.89
Hovenkamp argues that both errors could be avoided by reserving per se
treatment for "naked" restraints such as price-fixing or market division,
which are restraints that "[are] not accompanied by any significant
integration of production and [whose] profitability depends on power over
price. 9°
Antitrust would benefit tremendously from courts' express adoption of
Hovenkamp's test. Literal price-fixing agreements that are necessary for
efficient ventures would be protected from automatic illegality, and courts
could easily parse joint venture agreements to retain the restraints that
enhance efficiency while suppressing those that are patently anticompetitive.
Moreover, embracing the test would lead courts to abandon their approach of
applying the per se rule to clearly ancillary vertical practices, such as tying
and resale price maintenance. 91
HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 116.
85. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 152 F.3d 588, 591
(7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "divisions of markets are per se illegal, just like price-fixing
agreements"); United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 1992)
(approving a jury instruction stating, "Under the Sherman Act, price fixing is per se illegal.... [Ilt
does not matter why the fees were fixed or whether they were too high or low; reasonable or
unreasonable; fair or unfair").
86. See, e.g., Augusta News Co. v. Hudson News Co., 269 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (defining
"naked" agreements, to which the per se rule is applicable, as "those that are not part of a larger pro-
competitive joint venture"); Paycom Billing Svcs. v. MasterCard Int'l Inc., No.
CIVA03CV6150DGT, 2005 WL 711658, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005) ("Because MasterCard is
organized as a joint venture, its policies must be analyzed under the rule of reason.").
87. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 115.
88. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (approving an efficient blanket
licensing arrangement that required competitors to agree on price).
89. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (condemning a
naked output restriction that was adopted as part of a larger, efficiency-enhancing venture).
90. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 125.
91. See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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ii. Rethinking the Role of Stare Decisis.-In the past, the
Supreme Court overused the per se rule, applying it to practices that we now
understand to be efficiency enhancing.92 Because the Supreme Court has
warned the lower courts not to ignore its precedents in anticipation that it will
overrule its own decisions, 93 but reviews very few antitrust decisions, 94 these
bad per se precedents tend to languish. Hovenkamp observes that the rule of
stare decisis exacerbates this problem, for when the Court finally does have
occasion to reject earlier decisions wrongly applying the per se rule, it is
hindered by stare decisis concerns.95 Moreover, the Court's use of stare
decisis is irrationally asymmetric: when, after conducting numerous rule of
reason analyses of a challenged practice, courts determine that the practice
deserves per se treatment, stare decisis is not a factor. 96  Because of this
asymmetry, "Stare decisis has effectively created a ratchet for the per se rule,
permitting courts to move in one direction but not the other.,
97
The solution to this problem, Hovenkamp wisely argues, is to afford
stare decisis effect to the "method of analyzing antitrust restraints" (i.e., the
practice of applying the rule of reason to challenged restraints unless
convinced, based upon substantial experience, that the sort of restraint at
issue is output reducing), and not to judgments regarding particular
practices. Such an approach would provide the stability stare decisis aims
to ensure, while permitting antitrust law to improve as courts improve their
understanding of various business practices. In particular, the rule would
permit the Supreme Court to jettison its outmoded per se rules against joint
venture ancillary market division agreements, tying arrangements, and
minimum resale price maintenance. 99
92. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911)
(holding that vertical resale price maintenance is per se illegal); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984) (reiterating per se rule against tying).
93. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) ("We reaffirm that '[i]f a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."' (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
94. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 6 (discussing the decline in Supreme Court review of
antitrust decisions).
95. Id. at 118. In Jefferson Parish, for example, five Justices invoked stare decisis to uphold
the per se rule against tying. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-10 ("It is far too late in the history of
our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se."').
96. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 118; see, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) ("Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive
presumption that the restraint is unreasonable." (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982))).
97. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 118 (typeface altered).
98. Id. at 120-21 (typeface altered).
99. Id. at 121-23. Section II(B)(3) explains why some vertical practices should not be subject
to a per se rule. See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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b. Focusing and Structuring the Rule of Reason.-While the per se
rule figures prominently in antitrust analysis, courts evaluate most restraints
of trade under the rule of reason, which was most famously articulated by
Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable.
100
This version of the rule of reason, Hovenkamp contends, "created one
of the most costly procedures in antitrust practice."10' 1 Because the Brandeis
rule "never defines what it is that courts are supposed to look for," it has led
courts to "engage[] in unfocused, wide-ranging expeditions into practically
everything about the business of large firms in order to determine whether a
challenged practice was unlawful.'
0 2
In what is perhaps the most helpful section of his book, Hovenkamp
attempts to focus and structure the rule of reason. First, he states precisely
what courts should look for when conducting a rule of reason analysis: they
"must determine whether a particular practice reduces marketwide output
(measured by quantity or quality) and thus leads to higher prices or inferior
products., 10 3  To assist courts in answering this outcome-determinative
question, Hovenkamp proposes the following "sequence of questions and
proof": 
104
1. The court should begin by asking whether the practice at issue
arguably threatens to either reduce output or raise price. If not, the
challenge should be dismissed immediately.
10 5
2. If it is arguable that the practice at issue could raise price or reduce
output, then the court should ask whether the challenged practice is
naked (rational only if the participants have market power) or
ancillary to an arrangement that is itself plausibly efficient. If the
practice is naked, it is illegal; otherwise, further analysis is
necessary.1
0 6
100. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
101. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 105.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 105-06.
104. Id. at 106.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 106-07.
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3. At this point, the court should examine the market power held by the
parties to the challenged restraint.0 7 If this analysis suggests that the
exercise of market power is not plausible, the challenge should be
dismissed.
10 8
4. If the exercise of market power is plausible, the court should ask
whether there is persuasive evidence that the challenged practice
reduces participants' costs or improves the quality of their products
or services. Absent such evidence, the practice should be declared
illegal.109
5. If substantial efficiencies result from the practice, the court should
ask whether those efficiencies could be achieved using reasonably
available alternatives posing less danger to competition. If so, the
practice should be declared illegal." 0
6. Finally, if no less restrictive alternatives are available, the court
should balance the allocative inefficiencies threatened by the practice
against the productive or distributional efficiencies it offers."' In
cases of equipoise, courts should fall back on the presumption that
"free contracting produces beneficial results" and should reject the
plaintiff s challenge.' '
2
A key question raised by this structured rule of reason is who should
bear the burden of proof in each step? Because evidence in antitrust cases is
costly to procure and difficult to evaluate, the danger of evidentiary failure is
high. Consequently, the assignment of proof burdens (i.e., who wins if the
evidence fails?) is crucial. Hovenkamp therefore proposes that the burden of
proof be allocated to the party with the least plausible claim."13 He criticizes
the Supreme Court's California Dental Association decision, 114 in which the
Court effectively saddled the plaintiff with the burden of proving an
anticompetitive effect when the facts suggested that the plaintiffs theory of
107. To assess market power, the court should consider the concentration of the market and the
existence (and "height") of barriers to entry. See id. at 97, 102-04. In addition, it should consider
how the restraint would affect the market structure, asking whether there is a substantial competitive
market outside the arrangement and whether participants in the venture are free to offer the covered
product or service outside the restraints imposed by the arrangement. See id. at 142.
108. Id. at 107.
109. Id.
110. Id. If the practice is declared illegal at this point, any injunctive remedy should be limited
to condemning the current form of the practice or ordering the less restrictive alternative. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 149.
113. Id. at 146-47.
114. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
[Vol. 85:153
HeinOnline  -- 85 Tex. L. Rev. 168 2006-2007
Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model
anticompetitive collusion was more plausible on its face than the defendants'
theory that the restraint at issue was procompetitive.11 5
c. Reconceiving the "Agreement" Requirement.-An essential
element of any § 1 claim is an agreement between two or more economic
entities.1 16 Hovenkamp complains that courts have taken too "lawyerly" an
approach when determining whether this agreement requirement has been
satisfied. 17 By requiring proof of an express agreement of some sort-one
using words or conduct that is tantamount to words-courts have placed a
significant amount of harmful, tacit collusion beyond the reach of the
antitrust laws.' 18 Echoing a similar proposal advanced by Judge Posner,' l9
Hovenkamp advances a more "economic" understanding of the § 1
agreement requirement. 120 That economic understanding derives from
George Stigler's observation that oligopolies work poorly when information
is not rapidly communicated among participants1 2 1 and Posner's later
observation that poorly functioning oligopolies can be "improved" by the
adoption of various facilitators--chiefly, devices for enhancing
communication. 2 2 Although Hovenkamp makes a persuasive argument that
courts should adopt an economic understanding of the agreement element,
his discussion of how they should practically implement that understanding
is a bit disappointing.
Hovenkamp argues that judicial inference of an agreement, despite the
absence of any words or expressive conduct signifying such agreement, is
entirely proper because courts regularly "reconstruct" agreements among
parties who have not fully expressed their intentions. 123 When, for example,
sales contracts omit prices, courts routinely fill in such terms according to
what is objectively reasonable (i.e., the prevailing market price). 124
115. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 147 ("In fact, (the evidence] cuts very strongly in the
opposite direction, showing a market where customers are vulnerable and suppliers can be trusted
mainly to act in their own best interest.").
116. JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.02
(2d ed. 2004).
117. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 126-27.
118. See id. at 127 ("In concentrated markets with fungible products and observable prices
firms may reach a tacit understanding about output, and thus price, without ever engaging in verbal
communication with one another.").
119. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 69-93 (proposing an economic approach to identifying
collusion).
120. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 126-36.
121. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 45-46 (1964).
122. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, 1582-83 (1969); see also POSNER, supra note 10, at 60-69 (detailing the necessity of
effective communication for collusive practices to succeed).
123. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 130.
124. Id.; see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2005) (stating that where the contract price is "not
settled," the price should be "a reasonable price at the time for delivery"). Courts generally refuse
to fill in a missing quantity term, because there is no sufficiently definite answer to what constitutes
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Hovenkamp asserts three reasons courts should engage in similar "gap-
filling" when tacit collusion seems to be occurring. First, they should do so
because "[c]artel contracts are highly likely to be incomplete for the simple
reason that they are illegal."'' 25 In addition, the terms of a cartel contract, like
the price terms of incomplete sales contracts, are relatively easy to infer.
1 26
Finally, courts should not hesitate to fill in the gaps of cartel contracts
because the purpose of doing so is not to enforce the contracts but simply to
identify them.1 27 Term precision is therefore less important.
128
Having persuasively argued that it is proper for courts to infer
competitor agreements when tacit collusion appears to be occurring,
Hovenkamp turns to the issue of how courts should go about doing so. On
this point, he is a bit fuzzy. Judge Posner proposed that courts determine the
existence of tacit collusion by: (1) analyzing the structure of the market at
issue to see if it is "propitious for the emergence of collusion"; (2) examining
various pieces of economic evidence that indicate whether tacit collusion is
in fact occurring; and (3) making, on the basis of these two examinations, a
gestalt-like determination as to whether collusion is occurring. 2 9 This
approach is rather complicated; Posner suggests that courts consider
seventeen factors in their examination of market structure (step one), 30 and
he lists fourteen factors that would suggest the existence of actual collusion
(step two).' 3' This complexity leads Hovenkamp to distance himself from
an objectively reasonable quantity. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 130; see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(1)
(2005) ("[A] contract is not enforceable... beyond the quantity of goods shown.").
125. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 131.
126. See id. (observing that "when we move from buyer-seller relationships to relationships
among competitors, both price and quantity can become relatively determinate numbers,
particularly if the market contains few sellers").
127. Id.
128. Note, though, that courts might have to determine the terms of the "agreement" at issue in
order to fix a remedy. Hovenkamp may therefore, have overstated this "enforcement versus
identification" distinction.
129. POSNER, supra note 10, at 69.
130. The seventeen factors are: (1) whether the "[m]arket [is] concentrated on the selling side";
(2) whether there is a "fringe of small sellers"; (3) whether there is "[i]nelastic demand at [the]
competitive price"; (4) whether "[e]ntry takes a long time"; (5) whether the "[b]uying side of [the]
market [is] unconcentrated"; (6) whether the product is standardized; (7) whether the product is
durable; (8) whether "[t]he principal firms sell at the same level in the chain of distribution"; (9)
whether "[p]rice competition [is] more important [in the relevant market] than other forms of
competition"; (10) whether there is a "[h]igh ratio of fixed to variable costs"; (11) whether the firms
face "[s]imilar cost structures and production processes"; (12) whether "[d]emand [is] static or
declining over time"; (13) whether "[p]rices can be changed quickly"; (14) whether "[s]ealed
bidding" is used; (15) whether the "[m]arket is local"; (16) whether the firms in the market employ
"[c]ooperative practices"; and (17) "[t]he industry's antitrust 'record."' Id. at 69-79 (typeface
altered).
131. The fourteen factors are: (1) whether the firms in the market have "[f]ixed relative market
shares"; (2) whether there is "[m]arketwide price discrimination"; (3) whether the firms exchange
price information; (4) whether there are "[r]egional price variations"; (5) whether the firms have
submitted "identical sealed bids"; (6) whether there has been an abrupt change of price, output, or
capacity in the market; (7) whether there is "[i]ndustrywide resale price maintenance"; (8) whether
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Posner's suggested approach. 132  Hovenkamp fails, however, to offer a
workable alternative. While he maintains that it would be easy to reach tacit
collusion involving "facilitators created by explicit agreement" (e.g.,
agreements to exchange price information), 33 courts already condemn such
arrangements on a routine basis, reasoning that the agreement element of § 1
is satisfied by the agreement to employ the facilitator.134 When it comes to
the more difficult situations-those involving "practices that may be
facilitators, but appear to be imposed unilaterally"135-Hovenkamp has
nothing to offer. He rejects Judge Posner's multifactor test on grounds that it
would "pose formidable administrative difficulties,"'' 36 but he offers no
alternative. It seems that Hovenkamp is caught between his desire for
accurate characterization of highly subtle behavior and his generally laudable
desire to craft antitrust rules that are easily administrable. When it comes to
tacit collusion, he cannot have his cake and eat it too: he must either approve
the sort of complicated inquiry Posner proposes or fall back on the
"lawyerly" understanding of agreement, which is admittedly inaccurate but
easy to work with.
2. Exclusionary Practices.-Antitrust scholars are currently engaged in
a vigorous and fascinating debate over how courts should identify
"exclusionary" conduct-i.e., practices designed to eliminate existing
competition, deter new entry, or prevent output expansion by existing
firms. 137 In his discussion of exclusionary practices, Hovenkamp proposes a
the market shares of industry leaders are declining; (9) the "[a]mplitude and fluctuation of price
changes"; (10) the elasticity of demand at the market price; (11) the "[1level and pattern of profits"
among market participants; (12) whether "[m]arket price [is] inversely correlated with [the] number
of firms or elasticity of demand"; (13) the use of "basing-point pricing"; and (14) the existence of
"exclusionary practices." Id. at 79-93 (typeface altered).
132. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 133 (observing that Posner's approach toward
identifying markets conducive to collusion is "more difficult for courts to manage"); id. at 134
(arguing that Posner's approach to identifying the existence of tacit collusion would "pose
formidable administrative difficulties").
133. Id. at 133.
134. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (condemning an
agreement that fixed credit terms); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 603 (1936)
(condemning an agreement to post prices and adhere to them during published period); C-O-Two
Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1952) (condemning a product
standardization agreement used to facilitate collusion); cf Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 214
(2d Cir. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim based on exchange of salary information).
135. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 133.
136. Id. at 134.
137. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 44; Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 147 (2005); A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other
Exclusionary Conduct-Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (2006); Mark S.
Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying
Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (2006); Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section
2: The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2006).
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test for identifying such conduct and criticizes the other leading proposals.
Subpart Ill(B) of this Review addresses both his proposed test and his
criticisms of alternative tests.
138
Having set forth a general test for identifying exclusionary conduct,
Hovenkamp turns to the specific issue of strategic pricing. In particular, he
describes and defends existing rules on predatory pricing, criticizes extension
of those rules to cover so-called "limit" pricing, and sets forth a lenient
approach for evaluating "structured" discounts.
1 39
a. Predatory and Limit Pricing.-Hovenkamp's discussion of
predatory and limit pricing reflects a key theme that runs throughout The
Antitrust Enterprise: that antitrust rules should be easily administrable, even
if that means they must permit some anticompetitive practices to go
unpunished. 140  Hovenkamp thus defends the easily administrable Areeda-
Turner test for illegal predatory pricing (i.e., the price must be below the
seller's average variable cost ("AVC"), and there must be a likelihood that
the seller could eventually recoup its losses from charging below-cost prices
by charging supracompetitive prices), 14 even though he concedes the test is
somewhat underdeterrent. 1
42
Administrability concerns similarly lead Hovenkamp to reject predation
theories based on so-called "limit" pricing, which occurs when a firm with
market power (the power to set its prices in excess of its costs) sets its prices
below the profit-maximizing level so as to deter entry. 143 When the dominant
138. See infra notes 259-93 and accompanying text.
139. Hovenkamp's discussion of strategic pricing also highlights the particular danger of using
predatory pricing to maintain an oligopoly. He maintains that using predatory pricing to support an
oligopoly is "inherently more plausible" than a predatory pricing strategy designed to monopolize a
market by destroying rivals. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 168. In an oligopoly, below-cost
pricing may be employed as a device for punishing maverick firms that increase output or cut price.
Such a strategy has a greater chance of success than a monopolization strategy, Hovenkamp says,
because the perpetrator is not seeking the victim's destruction, which the victim would tenaciously
resist, but is instead seeking its compliance with a mutually beneficial collusive scheme, which the
victim is far less likely to oppose. Id. at 169.
140. See, e.g., id. at 50, 53 (listing, among five general principles for antitrust administration,
the principles that "not every anticompetitive practice can be condemned" and that "an antitrust rule
that cannot be administered effectively is worse than no rule at all" (typeface altered)).
141. Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 703-09 (1975).
142. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 163-68. The Areeda-Tumer test may be underdeterrent for
two reasons. Because marginal cost will always exceed AVC at a high level of output, which is
likely when there is actual predation, prices just above AVC, and thus legal under the Areeda-
Turner test, may be below marginal cost and thus capable of driving out equally efficient rivals. See
Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284,
287-306 (1977) (criticizing the test for affording defendants too much leeway). In addition, any
variable cost-based test will be quite lenient in industries with high fixed costs and relatively low
marginal costs (e.g., airlines, public utilities, or markets with a high intellectual property
component). HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 164.
143. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 162.
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firm has lower costs than potential rivals, which will frequently occur
because of economies of scale, it can set its prices at a level above its costs-
and therefore above predatory levels-but low enough to deter new entrants,
perhaps indefinitely. While such pricing may impose competitive harm and
injure consumers in the long run, Hovenkamp maintains that it is simply too
difficult for antitrust tribunals to police. First, "No court has ever developed
a workable test for determining when an above-cost price is
anticompetitive."' 44  In addition, there is the problem of fashioning a
remedy. 145 Forcing the defendant to raise its price to the monopoly level to
invite new entry poses serious risks to consumers (what if entry never occurs
or takes a long time?). Alternatively, forcing the defendant to lower its price
to competitive levels (i.e., to cost) would make eventual entry even less
likely and would "put the court in the position of a regulatory agency,
constantly monitoring the dominant firm's prices to ensure that they stayed
near the competitive level."'' 46 Hovenkamp therefore concludes that antitrust
law should not prohibit nonpredatory limit pricing.
b. Structured Discounts.-"Structured" discounts are discounts that
are conditioned upon something other than mere payment of the purchase
price. Hovenkamp discusses several types of structured discounts: slotting
fees (fixed discounts the manufacturer provides retailers in exchange for
shelf space), quantity or market share discounts (discounts conditioned upon
purchasing a certain quantity or percentage of one's requirements from the
seller), and bundled discounts (discounts conditioned upon purchasing
products from multiple product lines). 147
While a number of antitrust scholars have argued that various forms of




147. Id. at 171-73. Hovenkamp also discusses discounts resulting from package pricing, which
occurs when a seller "throw[s] in some extra component or service at less than the incremental cost
of supplying it." Id. at 173. For example, a car dealer selling a $20,000 car without a fancy stereo
might offer to include the stereo for an additional $100, even though the additional cost of the fancy
system is $350. See id. at 173-74. While one might argue that the stereo is being sold below cost,
Hovenkamp concludes that this sort of pricing should be legal as long as the package price exceeds
the cost of the transferred package of goods and services as a whole. Id. at 174. Package pricing,
Hovenkamp observes, is a useful device for secretly competing on price in an oligopoly, so banning
such pricing might strengthen oligopolies. Id. Moreover, "[t]here is no useful way of
disaggregating components and assigning a lawful minimum price to each one separately." Id.
148. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Statement for DOJ-FTC Hearing on GPOs 38-39 (Sept. 26,
2003), http://www.flc.gov/os/comments/healthcarecomments2/elhauge.pdf (arguing that bundled
and loyalty discounts to GPOs have anticompetitive effects that are not offset by buyer or seller
efficiencies); Robert A. Skitol, Comments for FTC Hearing on Small Business Issues (Nov. 8,
1995), http://www.fte.gov/opp/global!skitol2.htm (explaining that slotting fees could result in
higher cost of new product introduction and suggesting that existing statutory law exists to
challenge slotting fees); Willard K. Tom et al., Anticompetitive Aspects of Market Share Discounts
2006]
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discounts fairly leniently. Recognizing that all discounts resulting in an
above-cost price provide immediate consumer benefit and push prices toward
competitive levels, Hovenkamp takes the position that each of these types of
structured discounts should be permitted as long as the discount at issue does
not result in a below-cost price for the product or package of products being
sold. Slotting fees, he maintains, aim to "transfer risk from the retailer to the
manufacturer"; "show[] the merchant that the manufacturer's promise of
good sales is more than empty words"; and, unless resulting in below-cost
prices, can always be matched by an equally efficient rival. 149 Similarly, any
single product quantity or market share discount resulting in an above-cost
price could be matched by an equally efficient competitor. 50 Although one
might dispute Hovenkamp's explanation of why firms pay slotting fees
(Joshua Wright and Benjamin Klein have observed that the risk-transferal
explanation cannot explain the widespread practice of paying slotting fees on
well-established, non-risky products like Coca-Cola'51), the legal rule
Hovenkamp advocates for slotting fees and quantity or market share
discounts seems sensible. Both practices should be legal as long as they do
not drive prices below cost and are thus incapable of excluding an equally
efficient rival.
Bundled discounts, Hovenkamp concedes, are a different competitive
animal. Unlike slotting fees and quantity or market share discounts, a
bundled discount that results in above-cost pricing (for the bundle) may
exclude equally efficient rivals if they sell a narrower line of products.1
52
Consider, for example, a manufacturer (A) that sells both shampoo and
conditioner and competes against another manufacturer (B) that sells only
shampoo.153 B, the more efficient shampoo manufacturer, can produce a
bottle of shampoo for $1.25. It costs A $1.50 to produce a bottle of shampoo
and $2.50 to produce a bottle of conditioner. 54 If purchased separately, A
and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 627-30 (2000) (arguing that
quantity and market share discounts are anticompetitive).
149. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 171.
150. Id. at 172.
151. See Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, 50 J.L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 35), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=-773464
(observing that risk transferal theory "is inconsistent with the fact that slotting fees and other
promotional allowances often are paid by manufacturers on established products with predictable
demand, and that slotting contracts are often renewed after supermarkets have market experience
with a particular new product"); cf Joshua D. Wright, Slotting Contracts and Consumer Welfare, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-897394 (presenting an
empirical study utilizing a set of slotting contracts consisting entirely of incumbent products).
152. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 172-73.
153. This example is based on a hypothetical discussed in Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v.
Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
154. This example may appear unrealistic, for it is unclear why A would persist in producing
shampoo when it could presumably negotiate an agreement to buy the shampoo from B at a price
lower than its (A's) own cost of production. The parties' ignorance of their relative efficiencies, or
the costs of negotiating a favorable supply agreement, might account for such a situation.
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charges $2.00 for shampoo and $4.00 for conditioner ($6.00 total), but if the
consumer purchases both products at once, A will sell the combination for
$5.00. That $1.00 bundled discount results in a price that is $1.00 greater
than A's cost for the two products ($4.00). Nonetheless, the above-cost
bundled discount could exclude B. B could stay in the market only if it
charged no more than $1.00 for shampoo (so that a consumer's total price of
B's shampoo and A's conditioner would not exceed $5.00, A's package
price), but B's marginal cost of producing shampoo is $1.25. Accordingly,
A's bundled discount could eliminate B as a competitor even though B is the
more efficient producer and A's discounted price is above its cost of
producing the bundle. 
155
Although he acknowledges the possibility that above-cost bundled
discounts may result in the exclusion of rivals that are as efficient as the
discounter, Hovenkamp ultimately concludes that bundled discounts should
be legally permissible as long as the discounted price exceeds the cost of the
bundle. 156 Administrative concerns motivate his position. Hovenkamp states
that "[t]he great majority" of bundled discounts are procompetitive, and that
any approach that seeks to identify the few anticompetitive outliers "pre-
sumes that the court has much greater cost-measuring capacity than it has in
fact." 157 Accordingly, "[A]n administratively prudent rule might insist on a
showing that the discounted package is priced below average variable
cost.
1 58
This is a notable departure from, and improvement upon, the position
advocated by the Antitrust Law treatise, of which Hovenkamp is a co-author.
The treatise takes the position that the determinative question in evaluating
bundled discounts is whether the discount at issue could have excluded an
equally efficient, single-product rival.1 59 Exclusion would be possible, of
course, anytime a single-product rival could not match the entire amount of
the bundled discount without offering a below-cost price on its single
product. The treatise would therefore condemn the shampoo-conditioner
Regardless of its plausibility, the example is presented because it is very similar to an example
appearing in the case law on bundled discounts. See id. at 467.
155. See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 749, at
333-36 (Supp. 2006) (explaining how an above-cost bundled discount could exclude a rival that
was as efficient as the discounter).
156. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 172-73.
157. Id. at 173.
158. Id.
159. The treatise states:
The relevant question [in evaluating the legality of a bundled discount] is... whether
the challenged bundling practices would have excluded an equally efficient rival,
without reasonable justification.... A requirement that the bundling practice be
sufficiently severe so as to exclude an equally efficient single-product rival, and
without an adequate business justification, seems to strike about the right balance
between permitting aggressive pricing while prohibiting conduct that can only be
characterized as anticompetitive.
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 155, 749, at 322.
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bundled discount discussed above because a hypothetical shampoo-only
seller that was at least as efficient as seller A (e.g., seller B) could not match,
and would thus be excluded by, A's bundled discount. By contrast, the "ad-
ministratively prudent rule" Hovenkamp advocates in The Antitrust
Enterprise would approve A's bundled discount-despite the theoretical pos-
sibility that it could exclude sellers like B-because the discount results in a
price above the bundle's average variable cost.
While I have elsewhere criticized, 160 and offered an administrable
alternative to, 16 1 this cost-based test for evaluating bundled discounts, the
approach suggested in The Antitrust Enterprise is superior to that proposed
by the Antitrust Law treatise. The treatise's approach would permit less effi-
cient rivals to condemn bundled discounts, and thereby create a price
umbrella for themselves by concocting some theory under which a hypo-
thetical equally efficient rival might be excluded by the discount. 162  In
addition, the treatise's approach would prevent multiproduct sellers from
"cross-subsidizing" discounts (i.e., from funding a discount on one product
by giving up margin on other supracompetitively priced products) and would
thereby reduce consumer welfare. Suppose, for example, that the defendant
discounter sells products A, B, and C in concentrated markets that are subject
to oligopolistic pricing but are not actually cartelized (i.e., there are no actual
price agreements). Assume that the plaintiff competes with the defendant in
the market for product A but does not sell either product B or C. The
defendant's cost of producing each of products A, B, and C is $4.00 per unit.
Sold separately, the defendant charges $5.00 per unit for each of A, B, and C,
but it sells the A-B-C package for $13.50. This package pricing more
closely aligns the defendant's prices and costs and will tend to destabilize the
coordinated supracompetitive pricing in each of the A, B, and C markets.
From the standpoint of consumers and competition, this is a good thing:
prices have been pushed toward costs (where they would be in a perfectly
competitive market), oligopolistic pricing has been disrupted (and nondis-
counting rivals are likely to respond with discounts of their own), and
consumers are paying less.163 The Antitrust Law approach, however, would
condemn this arrangement because a hypothetical A seller whose per unit
cost is $4.00 would have to lower its A price to $3.50 in order to compete and
would thus be driven out of business. The approach may therefore condemn
160. Lambert, supra note 65, at 1700-05.
161. Id. at 1739-53.
162. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 177 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Greenberg, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the expert witness presented by the prevailing plaintiff had admitted that
the plaintiff was a less efficient producer than the defendant).
163. Ironically, the Antitrust Law treatise elsewhere recognizes the benefits of permitting the
sort of discount cross-subsidization that its approach to bundled discounting would forbid. See 10
PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 1758, at 334-35 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining the
"closer to the competitive level" benefit of package pricing); id. 1758, at 335 (explaining the
"disrupting oligopolistic collaboration" benefit of package pricing).
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cross-subsidization that would be good for consumers and competition in the
long run. The "administratively prudent rule" Hovenkamp suggests in The
Antitrust Enterprise is a significant improvement.
3. Vertical Practices.-Hovenkamp begins his discussion of vertical
restraints1 64 by observing that such restraints can provide producers with a
middle ground between distributing their products or services themselves
(self-distribution) and effectively purchasing such distribution services on the
open market (contract distribution). 65 Just as Ronald Coase famously ob-
served that entrepreneurs seek to minimize costs in determining whether to
bring functions within the firm or secure them on the open market,
1 66
Hovenkamp observes that producers seek to minimize costs in choosing
among self-distribution, contract distribution, or some middle-ground form
of distribution involving a vertical restraint. In short, they "have every in-
centive to make their distribution systems operate as efficiently as
possible. ,1 67 The upshot of this is that producer-imposed vertical restraints
should generally be efficient.
But that does not mean that vertical restraints can never be
anticompetitive. Sometimes powerful dealers or dealer cartels may seek to
reduce competition in their markets by persuading their suppliers to impose
such restraints. Thus, Hovenkamp concludes, "The principal focus of anti-
trust should be protection of the distribution market from the occasional
situation where excessive dealer power rather than manufacturer policy ex-
plains a distribution restraint."1 68 Building on these twin propositions that
producer-imposed vertical restraints are generally output enhancing but that
dealer-imposed vertical restraints may not be, Hovenkamp analyzes the rules
governing intrabrand and interbrand restraints and proposes several sensible
changes that would increase the degree of analysis afforded to vertical prac-
tices and require plaintiffs to prove that the practices are, in fact, output
reducing. His primary recommendations are (1) that minimum resale price
maintenance be afforded rule of reason treatment;' 69 (2) that the Robinson-
164. Vertical restraints are trade-restraining agreements between parties at different levels in
the distribution chain.
165. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 181-82.
166. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-95 (1937).
167. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 182.
168. Id. at 183.
169. Id. at 190-91. Hovenkamp observes that manufacturers may use minimum resale price
maintenance to spur their dealers to compete with one another on point-of-sale services rather than
price. Because manufacturers have an incentive to maximize sales, they are unlikely to set
minimum resale prices unless they have determined that doing so leads to increased output.
Accordingly, vertical minimum resale price maintenance schemes should not be per se illegal, as
they are under current law, see Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-
09 (1911), but should instead receive rule of reason treatment. The Supreme Court may soon move
in the direction Hovenkamp recommends. On August 28, 2006, the Court stayed the mandate
pending disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari in PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc., 171 Fed. App'x 464 (5th Cir. 2006), in which the Fifth Circuit followed Dr. Miles's
2006]
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Patman Act be repealed or interpreted to require plaintiffs to show a genuine
injury to competition; 170  and (3) that tie-ins, like exclusive dealing
arrangements, be analyzed under the rule of reason.'17
4. Business Mergers.-When it comes to evaluating horizontal business
mergers, 172 the antitrust enterprise has come a long way. Antitrust now
recognizes that most mergers create substantial productive efficiencies, that
this is a good thing (even though the efficiency gains might injure less effi-
cient rivals), and that mergers of competitors with relatively small market
shares are virtually never harmful.173 It was not always so.'74
Hovenkamp's discussion of business mergers lauds these developments
and offers three proposals. First, Hovenkamp argues for simplification of the
method of analyzing collusion-facilitating mergers. 75  He asserts that the
current merger guidelines, with their focus on precise calculation of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), are overly complicated and lend
per se rule against vertical minimum resale price maintenance. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc., No. 06Al79, 2006 WL 2466835 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2006).
170. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 197-98. The Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful for a
supplier to discriminate in price between dealers when doing so results in a harm to competition. 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000). To "discriminate" is to charge different prices for the same thing, and injury
to "competition" has been interpreted, quite unfortunately, to include disadvantaging, and thus
"hurting," a dealer. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 192. The upshot is that the Robinson-Patman
Act makes it difficult for manufacturers to charge different prices to their wholesalers. Hovenkamp
contends that this rule is economically senseless, for manufacturers have every incentive to
maximize the efficiency of their distribution systems and will price discriminate among wholesalers
only when doing so enhances output by, for example, incentivizing dealers to pursue sales
aggressively. Id. at 193. Accordingly, Hovenkamp concludes, the Robinson-Patman Act should be
repealed or should be read so that its "harm to competition" element requires a genuine harm to the
competitive system, not simply some disadvantage to a competitor. Id. at 198.
171. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 198-206. Reiterating familiar economic arguments,
Hovenkamp contends that both exclusive dealing and tying are usually output-enhancing, see id. at
202-06 (illustrating procompetitive benefits of both practices with reference to franchise
arrangements), but may occasionally lead to anticompetitive market foreclosure, id. at 199, 201.
Given that both practices are generally efficient but pose the same sort of competitive concern,
Hovenkamp argues that both should be analyzed under the rule of reason. Id. at 201, 206. Tying's
per se treatment, Hovenkamp says, "can be explained only as a relic of the leverage theory," which
assumed that a monopolist in one product market could enlarge its monopoly by tying a second
product, and thus monopolize both product markets together. Id. at 201. Hovenkamp correctly
explains that "[e]conomically, the leverage theory has been discredited" (by the Chicago School,
incidentally, see, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957)) because "a firm that is already charging its monopoly price for one product
cannot earn more in monopoly profits by tying a second, currently competitive, product and hiking
price on that as well." HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 201.
172. Whereas antitrust used to regulate vertical and conglomerate mergers, which almost never
present the sorts of anticompetitive threats with which antitrust is concerned, today it focuses almost
exclusively on horizontal mergers, which may sometimes be anticompetitive. HOVENKAMP, supra
note 8, at 207.
173. Id. at211.
174. See id. at 208-09 (discussing Warren Court era antipathy toward business mergers).
175. Id. at 214-15.
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merger analysis an unwarranted appearance of rigor and precision. 76 Next,
he argues that regulators should reject theories of harmful unilateral effects
when the merger at issue is not a merger to monopoly.1 77 He identifies two
problems with unilateral effects analysis, which asks whether a merger could
permit a unilateral price increase by a postmerger firm that would not be a
monopolist but would compete in a product-differentiated market.1 78 First,
such analysis frequently relies on retail pricing data (i.e., scanner data),
which are highly persuasive (because of the volume of data) but may be
misleading (because they reveal only demand-side effects).' 79 Second, such
analysis is unnecessary because, if product differentiation creates the power
to increase prices, the differentiated products are likely not in the same rele-
vant market to begin with, and the merger at issue may be analyzed more
simply as a merger to monopoly in a narrower market.1 80  Finally,
Hovenkamp argues that regulators and courts should recognize an
efficiencies defense to merger challenges but only when the merger creates
"unusual, measurable, and extraordinary efficiency gains."' 8 On this point,
he differs from Judge Posner, who would craft lenient merger rules to ac-
count for the general efficiencies created by mergers but would then ignore
those efficiencies in particular cases.1 82
C. Part III: Regulation, Innovation, and Connectivity
The final part of The Antitrust Enterprise considers the interface
between antitrust and industry regulation, the relationship between antitrust
and the intellectual property laws, and the role of antitrust in network
industries. 18
3
1. Simplifying the Regulation-Antitrust Interface.-Because natural
monopoly is a classic market failure and is frequently the subject of
government regulation, antitrust issues often arise within regulated
industries. When they do, courts are required to determine antitrust's
domain. Hovenkamp's chief contribution in his chapter entitled "Antitrust
under Regulation and Deregulation" (Chapter 10) is to set forth a single,





181. Id. at 220.
182. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 132-33.
183. The focus of Part III is antitrust's role in markets that are thought to deviate from
traditional economic norms-specifically, those "characterized by high rates of innovation, by costs
that decline with output and over time, and often by a high degree of interconnection among market
participants." HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 225. While such markets are frequently referred to as
"new economy" markets, Hovenkamp observes that the issues they present are not novel and have
been addressed by antitrust for decades. Id.
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simple rule for determining when antitrust will apply to activities that are
subject to regulation. 184
Traditionally, courts have recognized three different forms of antitrust
immunity, each with its own unique doctrinal formulation. Federal regula-
tory immunity, intended to prevent antitrust law from interfering with
regulators' various objectives, applies if expressly provided by statute or if
necessary to avoid conflicts between regulatory and antitrust requirements. 85
Courts typically find implied immunity if either an antitrust suit would inter-
fere with the agency's operations or the agency has considered, though not
necessarily expressly approved of, the particular behavior at issue. 186 State
action immunity, a "creature of federalism" designed "to give appropriate
recognition to state sovereignty,"' 87 applies if (1) the state has "clearly
articulated" and "affirmatively expressed" its intent to displace normal
competitive processes with some form of regulation covering the conduct at
issue, and (2) when the conduct at issue is by a private party, the conduct is
"actively supervised" by a state agency or official. 188  Finally, Noerr-
Pennington petitioning immunity, a product of the First Amendment, creates
immunity for petitioning the political branches for anticompetitive regulation
or asking the courts or regulatory agencies to punish one's rivals. 8 9 Notably,
this broad doctrine does not create immunity for "sham" petitioning-i.e.,
petitioning that "is intended not to obtain from the government a response
favorable to the petitioner, but rather to harass or suppress a rival."'
190
In an analysis that is sure to simplify the administration of the antitrust
laws, Hovenkamp explains that these three immunity doctrines can be
combined into "[a] [u]nified [r]ule for [a]ntitrust [riegulatory [i]mmunity. ' ' 9'
That unified rule would be based on two key principles: that antitrust is the
"residual regulator," which applies when more direct forms of regulation do
not; 192 and that antitrust is designed to regulate private conduct, not govern-
ment action. 193 Under the unified rule, conduct is immune from antitrust
scrutiny if two requirements are met:
First, the regulatory regime must be lawful and have jurisdiction over
the conduct that is the subject of the antitrust complaint.
"Jurisdiction" means the authority to evaluate conduct, including its
184. Id. at 236.
185. In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2003).
186. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 233.
187. Id. at 233-34.
188. Id. at 233; see, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1980).
189. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
190. HOvENKAMP, supra note 8, at 235.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 230.
193. Id. at 236.
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competitive consequences, and approve or disapprove it. Second, if
challenged private conduct is discretionary-that is, if a private firm
could have done something in a different way that causes less com-
petitive harm-that conduct must either have been reviewed and
approved by the agency, must be under ongoing study, or the agency
must have manifested its ability and will to evaluate the conduct if
asked. 194
Hovenkamp persuasively explains that this unified rule addresses all con-
cerns previously addressed by the three disparate immunities.195
2. Exposing the Myth of IP-Antitrust Conflict.-Hovenkamp's
discussion of the relationship between the intellectual property (IP) and
antitrust laws is primarily devoted to demonstrating that the two bodies of
law are not in conflict. Antitrust and IP admittedly seek to enhance output in
different ways. Antitrust does so by promoting competition, which
"squeezes monopoly out of the economy."' 196 The IP laws do so by prevent-
ing free riding on (and thereby encouraging) innovation.197 Nonetheless,
Hovenkamp maintains, the two bodies of law do not create genuine conflicts.
The various conflicts courts have purported to find, he says, have generally
resulted from legal misinterpretations. To demonstrate this point, he consid-
ers how IP law interacts with the antitrust rules governing horizontal
restraints and vertical practices; antitrust's treatment of fraudulent infringe-
ment suits and refusals to license IP rights; the antitrust rules on patent
nonuse and "misuse"; and the antitrust rules on product designs that create
incompatibility.198 Throughout this examination, he finds only one "true
antitrust/IP conflict": that between the antitrust laws prohibiting naked price-
fixing and the IP rules permitting a patent licensor to specify its licensee's
prices, even if the two are competitors. 199 This largely descriptive section of
the book persuasively debunks the notion that antitrust and IP are
194. Id. at 236-37.
195. Id. at 236. The unified rule addresses federal regulatory immunity concerns, for if the
harm is caused by something the federal government is doing there is no antitrust claim, nor is there
such a claim if (1) the harm is caused by a private party after that party's conduct has been reviewed
and approved by a disinterested federal agency; or (2) a federal agency is active and has the power
to review the harm-causing conduct. Id. The unified rule addresses state action immunity concerns,
for there is no antitrust claim if (1) the state authorized the challenged conduct by passing a statute
that mandated it, contemplated that it would occur, or specifically permitted it; or (2) that harm was
caused by a private party that was "actively supervised" by a state agency or official. Id. Noerr-
Pennington concerns are addressed by the unified rule: if the ultimate harm would occur because of
petitioned state action, then there would be no antitrust claim, but if the ultimate harm was inflicted
by the petitioning itself(i.e., the petitioning is a sham), then there would be an antitrust claim. Id.
In the latter scenario, "the injury to competition [would] result[] from private conduct that ha[d] not
been effectively supervised." Id.
196. Id. at 254.
197. Id. at 255.
198. Id. at 256-76.
199. Id. at 257.
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fundamentally in conflict and offers some helpful suggestions for mitigating
the tensions between the two bodies of law.
3. Antitrust and Networks.-The final chapter of The Antitrust
Enterprise discusses "[n]etwork [i]ndustries and [c]omputer [p]latform
[m]onopoly. ''200 Hovenkamp first describes in general the peculiar antitrust
concern presented by networks and then focuses on anticompetitive con-
certed behavior within "collaborative" networks and unilateral exclusionary
practices by network monopolists.
a. The General Problem.-A network, Hovenkamp states, is "a
market subject to economies of scale in consumption," 20 1 meaning that the
product or service being sold becomes more valuable to consumers (so that
they are willing to pay higher prices for it) as more consumers use it.20 2
While some networks are natural monopolies 20 3 (e.g., real estate brokers'
multiple listing service, which perpetually grows in value as more properties
are added), many are not (e.g., sports leagues, which eventually become
unmanageable),20 4 and Hovenkamp observes that it is possible to have rather
vigorous competition and innovation within a network (e.g., competition
among makers of VHS format video players). °5 He observes, though, that
networks have a distinctive property that makes them particularly susceptible
to anticompetitive concerns. That characteristic is "path dependence," which
means that once a network is fairly well established, anyone offering an
alternative-even a better one-faces significant market resistance.20 6
Networks thus present antitrust with yet another mixed bag: they convey
benefits because of the economies of scale in consumption, yet they impose
costs (allocative inefficiencies) to the extent path dependence creates market
power for their controllers. Hovenkamp offers some suggestions for how
antitrust should deal with both "collaborative networks" (those controlled by
groups of competitors) and "monopolized networks" (those controlled by a
single entity).
b. Collaborative Networks.-Collaborative networks may involve
two types of anticompetitive arrangements: first, network participants may
"agree to reduce their own collective output and raise price"; second, they
might "agree to exclude competing firms from the network, either to
200. Id. at 277.
201. Id.
202. For example, telephone service on a network becomes more valuable as more consumers
utilize the network and thus can receive calls from a subscriber. See id. at 277-78.
203. In networks that are natural monopolies, "costs decline or the network becomes more
desirable as it grows larger, to the point that a single network dominates the market." Id. at 278.
204. Id. at 278-79.
205. Id. at 280-81.
206. Id. at 279-80.
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facilitate a price increase or else to suppress rival technologies. 20 7
Hovenkamp recommends that courts police the first type of restraint by
parsing the arrangements between the network controllers agreement-by-
agreement, asking whether they plausibly restrain trade, and if so, whether it
is necessary for the efficient production of some product or service that the
venturers could not produce independently. °8 With respect to exclusionary
arrangements, which will frequently involve the adoption of standards that
exclude innovators, courts should pay close attention to whether the
venturers' decision regarding a standard would maximize the output of the
venture collectively. When the controllers of collaborative networks select a
standard that bars an innovation whose adoption would likely enhance the
venture's output, 20 9 anticompetitive exclusion is likely afoot.
c. Monopolized Networks (the Microsoft Case).-When it comes to
networks controlled by a single firm, Hovenkamp's suggestions are less
concrete. Antitrust contains no "monopolization without fault" doctrine that
would permit challenges to a unilaterally set monopoly price.21 Moreover,
antitrust generally (and wisely) rejects claims based on unilateral refusals to
deal because fashioning a remedy for such claims would require courts to act
as de facto public utility regulators (setting prices, etc.), a task for which they
are poorly suited.21 1 Actions against network monopolists must therefore be
based on something other than monopoly pricing or unilateral refusals to
deal, and Hovenkamp suggests that the governing standard should be the
market-wide balancing test he advocates for monopolization claims
generally.212 Subpart 111(B) of this Review criticizes that test.213
The bulk of Hovenkamp's discussion of monopolized networks is
devoted to explaining (quite lucidly) the Microsoft case,214 disparaging the
consent decree that brought an end to the government's challenge,215 and
exploring various possible antitrust remedies and "nonantitrust alternatives"
that might bring competition to the computer platform market.21 6
Hovenkamp believes that Microsoft did engage in illegal monopolization and
that the consent decree the government negotiated will ultimately fail to
217bring competition to the market for personal computer operating systems.
207. Id. at 286.
208. Id. at 287-88.
209. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (involving an
exclusionary standard adopted by members of the National Fire Protection Association).
210. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 291.
211. Id. at 291-92.
212. Id. at 292.
213. See infra notes 259-93 and accompanying text.
214. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 292-98.
215. Id. at 298-300.
216. Id. at 301-04.
217. Id. at 298-300.
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He recognizes, though, the difficulty of fashioning an effective remedy in
this sort of case. Structural remedies (breakups, etc.) have traditionally
proven ineffective, and the risks created by such remedies are particularly
great when, as in Microsoft, the firm at issue is a unitary firm that is not the
product of historical mergers. 1 8 On the other hand, he argues that "our
experience with conduct remedies has also not been satisfying." 21 9 He
therefore offers some "nonantitrust alternatives to the problem of computer
platform monopoly.,
220
Perhaps the most interesting-certainly the most novel-part of
Hovenkamp's Microsoft discussion concerns one of these "nonantitrust
alternatives"-namely his proposal that the government attempt to create
competition in the computer platform market by wielding its power as a
purchaser. 221 Hovenkamp argues that the government could generate
competition in the computer platform market "by requiring its departments
and agencies to use open-source software as an alternative to Microsoft
products., 222 Software that is "open-source" is distributed "subject to a li-
cense that makes it royalty-free and freely able to be copied, provided that
those who modify it and pass it on make it royalty-free as well., 223 Firms
that produce open-source software make money by charging for distribution,
224technical, and support services. They face a major shortcoming, however,
because their installed bases (and, thus, their network advantages) are
"excessively small., 225 This problem could be overcome, Hovenkamp says,
if governmental purchasers switched over to open-source software.
Moreover, Microsoft need not be precluded from supplying the government;
it could offer its own open-source products if it wished.226 In the end,
Hovenkamp maintains, "[T]here would continue to be a significant market
both for innovation and for collateral services such as support, except that it
would be competitive rather than monopolized. 2
27
218. Id. at 300-01.
219. Id. at 302.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 302-04. Hovenkamp points to the breakup of the aluminum monopoly as precedent
for this sort of governmental effort to affect the structure of markets by its participation in them. He
explains that after World War II, the federal government, which owned roughly half the productive
capacity for aluminum in the United States, sold its plants "under provisions of the Surplus Property
Act, which required the government to consider the impact on competition whenever it sold a
significant piece of government property to a private firm." Id. at 302. In light of this requirement,
Alcoa's small competitors (Kaiser and Reynolds) were permitted to bid for the government
facilities, but Alcoa was not. According to Hovenkamp, "The resulting market was considerably




225. Id. at 303.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 304.
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Hovenkamp's idea, while intriguing, raises difficult questions: Do
government purchases represent enough of the market to bring about the
structural changes Hovenkamp envisions? Would government agencies, at
least for a significant period of time, find themselves saddled with open-
source platforms that were either technically inferior or for which necessary
software was not available? Are profits from distribution, technical, and
support services sufficient to motivate continued innovation of platform
software that must be distributed royalty-free? There are, of course, only
speculative answers to these questions. But two things are clear: the pro-
posed strategy would involve tremendous start-up costs on the part of the
government, and there is a substantial risk that the strategy could fail to cre-
ate the competition Hovenkamp envisions. In light of these obvious costs
and risks (and the remarkable degree of innovation that continues to exist in
the operating systems market, despite its apparent monopolization), 228 I am
highly skeptical of the wisdom of this sort of massive industrial policy.
Nevertheless, Hovenkamp deserves credit for proposing a creative and at
least plausible solution to the difficult problem of what to do about
Microsoft's computer platform monopoly.
III. Two Major Criticisms
Having summarized and offered a number of fairly abbreviated
criticisms of The Antitrust Enterprise, I turn now to more extensive
criticisms of two of Hovenkamp's proposals. The troubling proposals relate
to the indirect purchaser rule and the standard for identifying exclusionary
conduct under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
A. The Indirect Purchaser Rule
Among Hovenkamp's suggestions for improving antitrust enforcement
is a proposal to abolish the indirect purchaser rule. The Supreme Court's
famous Illinois Brick229 decision held that those who purchase only indirectly
from a monopolist or cartel may not recover overcharge damages; 230 instead,
the direct purchaser may collect the entire amount of any overcharge, even if
that purchaser has passed some of the overcharge on to downstream (i.e.,
228. Hovenkamp's discussion of Microsoft's business strategy explains why such innovation
persists: Microsoft confronts the "monopoly durability" problem (i.e., the fact that its used products
compete with the new products it is creating) by aggressively innovating. Id. at 293.
229. I11. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
230. See id. at 728-29 (declining "to abandon the construction given § 4 [of the Clayton Act] in
Hanover Shoe-that the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or
distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or property' within the meaning of the section-in
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Court was wrong in Hanover Shoe to think that
the effectiveness of the antitrust treble-damages action would be substantially reduced by adopting a
rule that any party in the chain may sue to recover the fraction of the overcharge allegedly absorbed
by it").
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indirect) purchasers.23  As Hovenkamp notes, the primary rationale for the
Court's holding in Illinois Brick was the tremendous difficulty of accurately
determining, in a judicial proceeding, the proportion of an overcharge passed
on to downstream purchasers.232 The Court observed that the need to appor-
tion an overcharge among purchasers would "transform treble-damages
actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential
plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge ' 233 and would
thereby "greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness" of antitrust dam-
234
ages actions.
While agreeing that computing passed-on damages is extraordinarily
difficult, Hovenkamp maintains that that difficulty does not justify the rule
precluding indirect purchaser actions. He asserts that Illinois Brick relied on
two false assumptions: first, that overcharge is the proper measure of dam-
ages for every firm in the defendant's distribution chain; and second, that
calculating downstream damages requires tracing and apportionment of the
initial overcharge among the direct purchaser and the various downstream
purchasers.235  Once these two mistaken assumptions are rejected,
Hovenkamp says, the indirect purchaser rule lacks justification.
With respect to the first assumption, Hovenkamp argues that overcharge
is not the proper measure of damages for intermediary purchasers (e.g.,
assemblers, distributors, or retailers), who will generally respond to
supracompetitive pricing by passing along at least some of the price increase
236
and suffering reduced sales as a result of their higher prices. An over-
charge measure, Hovenkamp observes, "never captures the losses resulting
from lost volume. 237 By contrast, a "lost profits" measure would do so and
would account for the degree to which middlemen are able to pass over-
238
charge on to downstream purchasers. Hovenkamp thus concludes that "the
prevailing rule today that measures middlemen's damages by the overcharge
231. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968) (holding
that "the buyer is equally entitled to damages if he raises the price for his own product").
232. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 74; accord Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 731-32 (holding that
the Court's focus in Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494, on the difficulties of applying pass-on theories,
"applies with no less force to the assertion ... by plaintiffs than it does to the assertion by
defendants").
233. Il. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 737.
234. Id. at 732.
235. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 74-75.
236. Id. at 75-76. For example, if a cartel of liquor manufacturers raises the price of a bottle of
liquor from $10 to $14, retailers may respond by raising the retail price of a bottle from $13 to $16.
Their losses will consist of an absorbed overcharge of $1 per bottle sold plus the profit losses
resulting from reduced sales at a $16 retail price (less any incremental profits from increased sales
of alternative liquors). Id. at 74-75.
237. Id. at 75.
238. Id. at 75-76.
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is economically incorrect"; the proper measure of damages should be lost
profits.
239
With respect to the second assumption, Hovenkamp asserts that indirect
purchaser actions do not require tracing and apportionment of the
overcharge.240 Rather than calculating what percentage of an overcharge was
absorbed by middlemen and what percentage was ultimately paid by indirect
purchaser plaintiffs, courts could use the familiar "yardstick" or "before-and-
after" methods to determine the amount of overcharge paid by indirect pur-
chaser plaintiffs. The yardstick method calculates damages by comparing the
price the plaintiff paid to the prevailing price in some different but similar
market in which the anticompetitive practice at issue is not occurring. 24' The
before-and-after method compares the plaintiffs price to those prevailing in
the same market prior to and subsequent to the violation period.242 Neither
method would require determination of pass-on percentages.243 Hovenkamp
therefore contemplates a system in which injured middlemen would recover
lost profits and consumers would recover overcharges, with both lost profits
and overcharges measured using either the yardstick or before-and-after
method.
In terms of optimal deterrence of anticompetitive conduct,
Hovenkamp's proposed abrogation of the indirect purchaser rule is
undesirable. The indirect purchaser rule likely provides a closer to optimal
level of deterrence than Hovenkamp's proposed approach, and at a lower
cost of administration. To see why this is so, consider the optimal deterrence
model of antitrust damages and compare how the two approaches fare at
achieving optimal deterrence.
1. The Optimal Deterrence Model.-The optimal deterrence model of
antitrust damages begins with the assumption that the goal of a damages
remedy should be to discourage competitive practices that are wealth-
destroying, while encouraging conduct that creates wealth.244 In addition, the
model assumes that the sole purpose of damage-trebling is to account for the
likelihood that violations will not be successfully detected and prosecuted; in
other words, the model assumes that the probability of detection and success-
ful prosecution is precisely one-in-three.245 Based on these assumptions, the
model concludes that base (pre-trebled) damages should be set so that they
239. Id. at 73. Hovenkamp would calculate the lost profits measure through "an amalgamation
of the losses caused by [intermediate purchasers'] lost sales volume, plus any reduction in markup
that they may have been forced to take." Id. at 75-76.
240. Id. at 74-75.
241. Id. at 74.
242. Id. at 75.
243. Id.
244. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, § 17.2, at 657-63 (describing the optimal
deterrence model).
245. Id. § 17.2b, at 658.
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exceed the defendant's gain from engaging in the conduct at issue when that
conduct involves a net social loss, but not when the conduct enhances total
social wealth. If base damages are so determined, defendants will be incen-
tivized to engage in efficient conduct but to avoid inefficient conduct.2 46
It is first necessary, then, to determine how antitrust defendants gain
from anticompetitive conduct. In essence, they do so by restricting output
(via either collusion or exclusionary practices) so that buyers bid prices up
above competitive levels. As depicted in the classic monopoly pricing model
(Figure 1), this output restriction has two primary effects on social wealth.
First, a measure of wealth is transferred to sellers from consumers, who have
to pay higher prices for the products at issue. This wealth transfer is depicted
by square 2-4-5-3 in Figure 1. Second, a number of consumers-those with
the "most elastic" demand-substitute away from the product at issue and
toward consumption alternatives (including perhaps forbearance from
consumption) that create less total wealth. This inefficient substitution is
depicted by the so-called "deadweight loss" triangle created by points 4-5-6.
The "surplus transfer" (square 2-4-5-3) represents a gain for the defendant;
the deadweight loss (triangle 4-5-6) does not.247
246. Id. § 17.2b, at 660. I am referring, of course, to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See generally
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 190-91
(1999).
247. For a more thorough discussion of this analysis, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, § 17.2b,
at 657-60.
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In light of this model, it is easy to state the optimal deterrence rule for
practices that do not create any efficiencies (e.g., a naked cartel): Damages
should be set at an amount equal to or exceeding the amount of the
overcharge, square 2-4-5-3. In such cases, the only benefit the defendant
receives from his anticompetitive conduct is a supracompetitive price, so
forcing him to pay an amount of damages equal to the increment of the price
that is above competitive levels (i.e., to the overcharge) will render the be-
havior at issue unprofitable for him. While other areas of law (e.g., torts)
typically calculate damages according to the loss occasioned by a
defendant's behavior, a damages rule requiring the defendant to pay only the
deadweight loss caused by his anticompetitive conduct would underdeter be-
cause deadweight loss will generally be less than the amount of wealth
transfer from consumers to defendants. Instead, the damages amount should
be determined on the basis of the defendant's gain, which, absent any effi-
ciencies created by the defendant's conduct, should be equivalent to the
overcharge.248 A damages figure in excess of that amount will provide
248. If, for example, a defendant's conduct transferred $1,000 from consumers to defendants
and produced $500 in social loss, a rule requiring the defendant to pay merely the social cost of his
conduct ($500) would not motivate him to forego the conduct. To deter the conduct, damages
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optimal deterrence because there is no need to worry about overdeterring
conduct that produces no efficiencies.
24 9
When the defendant's conduct also creates some efficiencies, the
situation becomes more complicated. Figure 2 depicts the effects of this sort
of conduct: The practice causes the defendant's costs to drop from MC 1 to
MC 2, creating wealth represented by area 2-5-6-3; wealth is transferred from
consumers to the defendant in an amount depicted by rectangle 1-4-5-2; and
there is a deadweight loss in an amount depicted by triangle 4-5-7. Once
again, the wealth transfer is, from an efficiency standpoint, irrelevant; the
harm it causes consumers is precisely offset by the benefits to producers.
Whether the practice is efficient or inefficient, then, turns on the relative
magnitudes of the defendant's cost-savings and the deadweight loss. If the
defendant's cost-savings (rectangle 2-5-6-3) exceed the deadweight loss
(triangle 4-5-7), then the practice is Kaldor-Hicks efficient and should not be
deterred. By contrast, if the deadweight loss exceeds the defendant's cost-
savings, deterrence is proper.
Figure 2: Conduct creating both market power and productive efficiency
PM Pm "1.......... 4
MR
Of course, it would be virtually impossible for courts to conduct this
sort of "cost-savings versus deadweight loss" balancing in litigation. They
could, however, adopt a damages rule that would motivate potential defen-
dants to take their best stab at such balancing.25 ° If businesses considering
potentially violative conduct knew they would have to pay (1) the overcharge
249. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 66, § 17.2b, at 661.
250. Id. § 17.2b, at 659.
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amount and (2) the amount of any deadweight loss occasioned by their
conduct (and if the damages multiplier were properly set to account for the
likelihood of detection), optimal deterrence would be achieved.251 Busi-
nesses would stand to gain from Kaldor-Hicks efficient conduct because
their expected benefits (overcharge plus efficiency gains) would exceed their
expected liability (overcharge plus deadweight loss). For Kaldor-Hicks inef-
ficient conduct, businesses would expect to pay more in liability (overcharge
plus deadweight loss) than they would collect in benefits (overcharge plus
efficiency gains). The optimal deterrence model thus posits that antitrust
damages should be set to equal the overcharge amount plus the amount of the
deadweight loss occasioned by the behavior at issue.252 For practices that
create no efficiencies, such as naked price-fixing, the damages award would
be larger than necessary to motivate efficient behavior (simple overcharge
disgorgement would suffice), but overdeterrence is not a concern in such
cases.
253
In practice, courts do not award overcharge damages according to the
optimal deterrence formula. Given the difficulty of measuring deadweight
loss in litigation, courts typically ignore it altogether in overcharge cases and
set base (pre-trebled) damages equal to the amount of the overcharge only-
that is, the difference between the price actually paid to the defendant and
254that which would have prevailed under competitive conditions. As noted,
courts typically determine the latter amount by using the yardstick or before-
and-after methods.
2. The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Optimal Damages in Overcharge
Cases.-The optimal deterrence model suggests that Hovenkamp's proposed
abandonment of the indirect purchaser rule is undesirable. In overcharge
cases involving naked practices, it would increase administrative costs with-
out providing any benefit in terms of added deterrence. In overcharge cases
involving practices that create efficiencies, it would both increase adminis-
trative costs and exacerbate overdeterrence.
a. Overcharge Cases Involving Naked Practices.-If a business's
only benefit from adopting a practice is an overcharge, and the business
knows it must disgorge that overcharge, then the business will not spend
resources to adopt the practice. Accordingly, optimal deterrence can be
achieved in overcharge cases involving practices that do not create efficien-
cies for the defendant simply by requiring the defendant to disgorge the
amount of any overcharge (square 2-4-5-3 in Figure 1). The defendant does
251. Id. § 17.2b, at 660.
252. Id. § 17.2b, at 661.
253. Id.
254. See id. § 17.2d, at 663-66 (contrasting the optimal deterrence model with the actual
practice of courts).
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not care whether it pays the overcharge to the direct purchaser or to the
ultimate consumers of its products; all that matters is that it be forced to
disgorge the overcharge. The indirect purchaser rule permits that outcome in
only a single lawsuit. By contrast, Hovenkamp's proposed approach would
require at least two lawsuits: one by the direct purchaser and at least one by
downstream purchasers. Hovenkamp's proposed approach thus increases
administrative costs without providing any incremental benefits in terms of
deterrence; a single overcharge lawsuit by the direct purchaser would suffice.
b. Overcharge Cases Involving Practices That Enhance
Defendants' Efficiency.-The optimal deterrence model suggests that mere
disgorgement of the defendant's overcharge may not provide a sufficient
level of deterrence in cases in which the defendant's practice creates
efficiencies. If deadweight loss exceeds the cost-savings occasioned by the
practice at issue, the practice will be inefficient but will not be deterred by a
rule requiring merely the disgorgement of the overcharge to the direct
purchaser. In this context, Hovenkamp's proposed approach (a lost profits
action by middlemen and an overcharge action by final consumers) might
seem desirable because it would bring damages closer to the "overcharge
plus deadweight loss" figure recommended by the optimal deterrence model.
This assumes, though, that damage-trebling is equally irrelevant in cases
involving naked practices and those involving practices that create cost
savings for defendants. Recall that the optimal deterrence model assumes
away the effect of trebling by assuming that the chances of detecting and
successfully prosecuting an overcharge-causing offense are precisely one-in-
three.255 Adopting that assumption, the model can focus on setting base dam-
ages so that inefficient conduct is rendered unprofitable but efficient conduct
is not. If the likelihood of successful detection and prosecution is greater
than one-in-three, then the damages measure recommended by the optimal
deterrence model will be overdeterrent.
As Hovenkamp himself acknowledges, 256 the likelihood of detection
and successful prosecution is significantly greater when the anticompetitive
practices are "public acts" like "mergers, most joint ventures, many
exclusionary practices, and nearly all vertical contract practices" than when
they are clandestine practices like naked price-fixing.257 Moreover, these
public practices are precisely the sorts of practices that create cost savings for
defendants. In short, it is likely that the damages measure that applies under
the indirect purchaser rule is already overdeterrent because three times the
overcharge occasioned by a public practice likely exceeds the overcharge
plus the deadweight loss occasioned by the practice at issue. Hovenkamp's
proposal to increase damages further (lost profits for middlemen plus the
255. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
256. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 67.
257. Id. at 66.
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overcharge to consumers) would exacerbate this overdeterrence and would
increase administrative costs by requiring multiple lawsuits rather than just
one. 58 From a deterrence standpoint, then, Hovenkamp's proposal to aban-
don the indirect purchaser rule seems unwise.
B. The Exclusionary Conduct Standard
As noted above, Hovenkamp proposes a marketwide balancing test for
exclusionary conduct. Under his test, which is also the test set forth in the
Antitrust Law treatise, 25 9 an act is exclusionary if it:
1. is reasonably capable of creating, enlarging, or prolong-
ing monopoly power by limiting the opportunities of
rivals; and
2. either [2a] does not benefit consumers at all, or [2b] is
unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits
produced, or [2c] produces harms seriously dispropor-
tionate to the resulting benefits. 60
Hovenkamp maintains that his proffered test is preferable to the other
leading contenders: the "profit sacrifice" test;26' tests that focus on whether
the practices at issue "raise rivals' costs or impair their efficiency"; 262 and
Judge Posner's test, which asks whether the practice at issue is "likely in the
circumstances to exclude from the defendant's market an equally or more
efficient competitor., 263 In actuality, Hovenkamp's proposed test would be
exceedingly difficult for courts to administer and would provide businesses
with little ex ante guidance on the legality of novel practices. At least two of
the approaches Hovenkamp rejects (or versions of them, at least) would
likely prove superior.
1. Shortcomings of Hovenkamp's Marketwide-Balancing Approach.-
Hovenkamp never refers to his proposed test as a "marketwide-balancing"
258. Of course, if Hovenkamp's proposal to limit treble damages to actions based on
clandestine practices were adopted, this overdeterrence problem would not exist. To the extent
Hovenkamp recommends his trebling limitation and abandonment of the indirect purchaser rule as a
"package deal," the latter recommendation is less troubling. As a stand-alone suggestion, however,
it seems unwise.
259. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 651a, at 72 (2d
ed. 2002).
260. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 152.
261. See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 137, at 389-95 (arguing for a variation on the profit
sacrifice test that focuses on whether an alleged monopolist's conduct "would make no business or
economic sense but for its likelihood of harming competition"); Werden, supra note 137, at 422-25
(same).
262. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 153; see, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 44, at 315 (proposing a
test that focuses on whether monopoly power is furthered by "impairing rival efficiency" regardless
of whether it "enhances monopolist efficiency").
263. POSNER, supra note 10, at 194-95.
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approach, but that must be what the test contemplates. In practice, all the
"action" in the test occurs in part 2c (as labeled above). Challenges involv-
ing conduct that fails to meet the first prong will generally be dismissed
quickly, and prongs 2a and 2b "concern the conceptually easy case of harm
without benefit. 2 64 Thus, in the only cases in which courts actually need
some sort of test to guide their decisionmaking-i.e., challenges to mixed
bag conduct that creates both efficiency benefits and anticompetitive harm-
the outcome will turn entirely on the balancing required by part 2c.
Douglas Melamed has recently identified two significant problems with
this approach.265 First, marketwide balancing of the various effects of mixed
bag conduct is extremely difficult for courts and enforcement agencies and
would likely exceed their competence.266 As Melamed observes, balancing
the benefits and harms of efficiency-creating but exclusion-causing conduct
would require courts to (1) "quantify[] both welfare effects by estimating
price, cost, and quantity of output under two conditions-before and after
exclusion of rivals"; (2) "deal[] with the time dimension (both duration and
discounting to present value) of each"; and (3) "compare[] both to a hypo-
thetical but-for world in which the conduct did not take place., 267 Of course,
courts could make educated guesses about welfare effects or limit their con-
sideration to static, rather than dynamic, welfare effects, but such shortcuts
"would move the analysis . . . toward arbitrary decision. 268
A second problem with Hovenkamp's test for exclusionary conduct is
that it provides businesses with little ex ante guidance regarding the legality
of proposed courses of conduct and is therefore likely to deter efficiency-
enhancing, but novel, practices. Melamed explains:
The balancing test would require a firm to determine, before it
embraces new competitive strategies, not just the impact of the
264. Melamed, supra note 137, at 380 (describing and criticizing the marketwide-balancing test
proposed in the Antitrust Law treatise).
265. Id. at 381-82. Melamed articulates a third objection in addition to the two discussed
herein: that the balancing test "flies in the face of. . . the notion that firms are entitled to benefit
from success achieved by 'competition on the merits,' even if the success includes monopoly
power." Id. at 382. For purposes of brevity, I concentrate on Melamed's first two criticisms, which
I believe are his most persuasive objections.
266. See id. at 381 (arguing that precise comparisons of the various effects of alleged
monopolists' actions with hypothetical situations in which the actions did not occur are beyond the
competence of courts and enforcement agencies); see also Werden, supra note 137, at 431
(observing that welfare balancing in "[a] case that entails both consumer benefits, as from new or
better products, and consumer harms, as from higher prices, may overtax the quantitative tools of
economics").
267. Melamed, supra note 137, at 381; see also Werden, supra note 137, at 431 ("Even if
economists could perfectly sort out the relatively short-run economic consequences of all
marketplace conduct, they still could not accurately account for the important long-term effects of
any remedial action on incentives for innovation and risk taking-the twin engines of our
prosperity.").
268. Melaned, supra note 137, at 381 (discussing the likely effect of shortcuts such as
"substituting intuition or educated guesses for precise calculation").
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strategies on its business, but also the impact on rivals and to weigh
the benefits to its consumers against the long-run harm to consumers if
the firm's less-inventive rivals are weakened or driven from the mar-
ket as a result. Assessing the long-run harm would require, among
other things, calculating the duration of the harm in light of responses
by competitors, new entry, and future innovation.
269
Given the near impossibility of this inquiry and the high cost of making
a mistake (i.e., an adverse treble damages judgment), firms would likely
forego aggressive new methods of competition to the detriment of
consumers.
Of course, any test that purports to identify exclusionary conduct is
likely to be difficult to apply to mixed bag conduct, to generate some false
positives or false negatives, and to chill some procompetitive practices.
Hovenkamp's test thus need not be perfect, just better than the alternatives.
While Hovenkamp contends that his test is preferable to the other standards
theorists have articulated,27 ° the test is likely inferior to both the profit-
sacrifice test and a revised version of Judge Posner's test.
271
2. Defending (a Version oJ) the Profit-Sacrifice Approach.-As
Hovenkamp construes the profit-sacrifice test, which the Department of
Justice has advocated in a number of monopolization cases,272 the test deems
conduct exclusionary "when the defendant sacrifices immediate profits as
part of a strategy whose profitability depends on the exclusion of rivals.,
273
Hovenkamp criticizes this test for being both over- and underinclusive.274
The test is "too broad," he says, because it would condemn certain competi-
tive activity, such as new product development. 275 He offers the example of
269. Id.
270. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 152-53 (criticizing tests based on profit sacrifice, raising
rivals' costs, and excluding equally efficient rivals).
271. Hovenkamp's test is superior to approaches that focus on whether the practice at issue has
raised rivals' costs or impaired their efficiency. As Hovenkamp correctly observes, these tests are
"helpful but incomplete" because they would condemn output expansions that cause rivals to lose
economies of scale and would fail to condemn predatory pricing campaigns that deprive rivals of
revenue but do not necessarily increase their costs or reduce their efficiency. Id. at 153; see also
Lambert, supra note 65, at 1712-17 (similarly criticizing a leading "raising rivals' costs" theory).
272. See, e.g., Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
16-19, Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-
682), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/O5/trinkof.pdf (arguing that "conduct is exclusionary
where it involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it
helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power" and stating that if a refusal to deal
"involves a sacrifice of profits or business advantage that makes economic sense only because it
eliminates or lessens competition, it is exclusionary"); see also Werden, supra note 137, at 413
(observing that "[i]n recent years, the Department of Justice has consistently advocated the no
economic sense test in all its Section 2 cases").
273. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 152.
274. Id. ("Th[e] test is both too broad and too narrow.").
275. Id. Note that Hovenkamp is echoing a criticism made by Einer Elhauge. See Elhauge,
supra note 44, at 274-75.
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a firm that invests heavily in designing a new mousetrap that, when
marketed, will drive out the competition. Such innovation, which appears to
involve an immediate profit sacrifice that leads to monopoly, obviously
should not be condemned under the antitrust laws.276 On the other hand,
Hovenkamp asserts, the test is "too narrow" because it would fail to condemn
conduct, such as various acts of monopoly maintenance, that "may be profit-
able the instant they are in place yet also anticompetitive.
277
Both of Hovenkamp's arguments are based on a misunderstanding of
the profit-sacrifice test (at least the version the government has advocated).
The government's proposed profit-sacrifice test is perhaps better construed as
a "no economic sense" test,278 which holds that "conduct is not exclusionary
or predatory unless it would make no economic sense for the defendant but
for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition., 27 9 Construing the test in
this manner eliminates Hovenkamp's concerns about its over- and
underinclusivity. Hovenkamp's argument that the test is "too broad" because
it would condemn investments in innovation assumes that it is sufficient to
ask whether the defendant's conduct entails a short run profit sacrifice. It is
not; if the answer to that question is "yes," the test further queries why it
would be rational to make that sacrifice. 280 If there is some profit-enhancing
rationale for doing so besides a lessening of competition, then the test is not
satisfied. Hovenkamp's mousetrap example therefore fails. While
"invest[ing] heavily in designing a better mousetrap ', 281 may entail a short
run profit sacrifice, that sacrifice would be economically rational if it were
expected to result in a superior mousetrap for which consumers would be
willing to pay a higher price; its rationality does not depend on the
elimination of rivals.282
276. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 152.
277. Id. As an example of immediately profitable exclusionary devices, Hovenkamp points to
"tying and exclusive dealing contracts, such as Microsoft's insistence that Windows users also take
Internet Explorer." Id.
278. Werden, supra note 137, at 413-14 (describing the version of the test the Department of
Justice has articulated in recent § 2 cases).
279. Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
272, at 15.
280. See Werden, supra note 137, at 424 ("When the defendant's conduct entails a short-run
profit sacrifice, the no economic sense test further asks why it is rational to make that sacrifice.").
281. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 152.
282. Melamed offers another response to Hovenkamp's mousetrap example. He says the
example is unpersuasive because it "overlooks the fact that only conduct that excludes rivals is
subject to the sacrifice test." Melamed, supra note 137, at 395. Development of a better mousetrap
could not possibly exclude rivals; only commercialization of that development could do so. Thus,
the relevant conduct is the mousetrap's commercialization. If the terms of that conduct would not
be profitable for the firm but for the exclusion of rivals (e.g., if the terms on which the mousetrap
was sold were not themselves profitable, so that the commercialization efforts would become
profitable only after rivals had exited the market and the firm was able to switch to more favorable
terms of trade), then the commercialization terms would be exclusionary. Otherwise, they would
not be. In any event, the development efforts themselves could not be exclusionary because they
could not exclude rivals. Id. at 395-96.
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Hovenkamp's argument that the test is "too narrow" because it would
fail to condemn immediately profitable anticompetitive acts similarly rests on
a misunderstanding of the profit-sacrifice test. Hovenkamp mistakenly as-
sumes that the test requires two time periods: a short run period in which
there are losses followed by a later period in which there is monopoly
283
recoupment. Instead, the test focuses on the nature of the conduct and
asks whether it would reduce profits but for its tendency to eliminate
284competition. The key question is not when the conduct will be profitable
but why it is (or is expected to be) profitable. So construed, the test con-
demns practices, such as acts of monopoly maintenance, that "may be
profitable the instant they are in place, yet also anticompetitive.
' 285
Thus, the leading version of the profit-sacrifice test (or, more
accurately, the "no economic sense" test) does not suffer from the defects
Hovenkamp claims to identify. The test is likely superior to the marketwide
balancing approach Hovenkamp advocates. It promises to condemn most
cases of exclusionary conduct, and, unlike Hovenkamp's proposed approach,
it is relatively easy for courts to administer and provides clear, reliable guid-
ance to business firms considering novel competitive practices.
3. Defending (a Version oj) Judge Posner's Approach.-Hovenkamp's
proposed marketwide balancing test is also inferior to a version of Judge
Posner's test for exclusionary conduct. Posner has proposed that exclusion-
ary conduct be defined as acts "likely in the circumstances to exclude from
the defendant's market an equally or more efficient competitor. ' 286
Hovenkamp maintains that this test is "too narrow" because (1) it would not
reach some clearly anticompetitive conduct, such as an infringement suit
based on a fraudulent patent claim;287 (2) there is value in preventing socially
useless practices that are likely to exclude rivals "who can realistically be
expected to emerge under the circumstances," even if those rivals are not as
efficient as the perpetrator; 288 and (3) the test would not reach conduct that
prevents rivals from achieving minimum efficient scale and thereby becom-
289ing as efficient as the perpetrator.
Examined closely, each of these criticisms either fails or at best calls for
no more than a modest revision of Judge Posner's standard. The first
283. See id. at 391 (observing that it is "incorrect" to interpret the profit-sacrifice test to suggest
that "conduct is anticompetitive only if it entails losses in the short run followed by monopoly
recoupment in some later period").
284. See id. ("As the Justice Department has long recognized, the test depends, not on the
timeline, but rather on the nature of the conduct--on whether it would make no business or
economic sense but for its likelihood of harming competition.").
285. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 152.
286. POSNER, supra note 10, at 194-95.
287. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 153.
288. Id. at 154.
289. Id.
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criticism fails because the test for identifying exclusionary conduct is
applicable only to mixed bag conduct; it need not reach injurious practices
with no redeeming virtues, for such practices are easy to condemn without
reference to any exclusionary conduct standard.290  The second criticism
should be rejected because it assumes that courts can identify practices that,
in Hovenkamp's words, "confer no significant social benefits, 291 and should
thus be condemned if they exclude the only rivals likely to appear on the
scene. If the history of antitrust law (e.g., tying doctrine) has taught us
anything, it is that courts are bad at recognizing when novel, exclusion-
causing conduct has beneficial properties. Finally, Hovenkamp's third
criticism-that Posner's test fails to condemn practices that prevent the
achievement of minimum efficient scale-could be dealt with by revising the
Posner test to condemn practices likely to exclude "competitive rivals," de-
fined as rivals who are as efficient as the perpetrator or are likely to become
so if permitted to achieve minimum efficient scale. I have elsewhere argued
for such a revised version of the Posner test and have applied it to the diffi-
cult issue of bundled discounts,292 which are a classic mixed bag practice.293
IV. Conclusion
The Antitrust Enterprise is an important book. Unlike its most notable
predecessors,294 the book is more concerned with execution than principle.
But, as Judge Posner has remarked, that is where the challenge now lies for
economically minded antitrust scholars.295 Like so many of the business
practices with which antitrust tribunals have grappled, The Antitrust
Enterprise is a mixed bag-some good, some troubling. Yet, as with the fa-
mous NCAA joint venture,296 the good far outweighs the bad. Above all,
Hovenkamp is a marvelous teacher. His impressive grasp of law, economics,
and history is matched only by the lucidity of his explanations and the clarity
of his prose. While some of its suggestions are troubling, The Antitrust
Enterprise is a wonderful book that will benefit generations of antitrust
scholars and students alike.
290. Cf Melamed, supra note 137, at 399 (observing that "conduct [that] has no efficiency
properties and serves only to harm rivals... can be readily condemned without application of either
a balancing test or a sacrifice test," for such conduct "does not raise the issue at which these tests
are directed: what to do about conduct that both has efficiency benefits and excludes rivals").
291. HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 153.
292. Lambert, supra note 65, at 1740-53.
293. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
294. BORK, supra note 1; POSNER, supra note 3.
295. See POSNER, supra note 10, at viii ("The chief worry at present is not doctrine or direction,
but implementation.").
296. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (recognizing that
most agreements between members of the NCAA were necessary for the creation of college football
and thus output-enhancing but holding that one agreement, which limited television broadcasts, was
anticompetitive).
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